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Caroline Kaeb*
Abstract: The Supreme Court has been wrestling with the doctrinal premises of
corporate personhood on several occasions in recent years. The Court follows a
long history of jurisprudence that has been criticized as cryptic or nebulous at
best by many scholars. Especially since the recent economic crisis, the doctrine
of corporate personhood has had polarizing effects on the public debate about
the role of corporations in society. At a policy level, the debate revolves around
questions about the scope of regulatory reach of the state over business; at a sociological level, the issue presents itself as an oxymoron, whether “corporations
have human rights,” as the Wall Street Journal postulated. The article provides
an important insight into what is wrong with the majority opinion in Citizens
United. The paper argues that corporate legal theory (about the nature of the
firm) should inform the debate on corporate constitutional rights in order to
avoid intra-corporate conflicts with competing interests of shareholders and—
depending on the prevailing corporate theory in a national context—its other
stakeholders. In essence, we should put the “corporate” back into corporate
personhood.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has been the perceived thought leader on corporate
personhood when compared to major foreign legal systems. As early as
1886, the U.S. Supreme Court coined the legal concept of corporate personhood in its Santa Clara decision: “The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to those corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.”1 The Supreme Court’s ruling
marked the beginning of a line of jurisprudence that has increasingly watered down the distinction between corporations and human beings. Thus,
the Court has endowed corporations with rights that go well beyond the
original corporate privilege of limited liability and even beyond mere commercial rights.
The Court has extended to corporations constitutional rights that primarily avail to natural persons, evoking criticism of judicial activism and a
pro-business bias.2 More recently, the Court reinforced its position on corporate personhood in its infamous decision in Citizens United holding that
the (corporate) nature of the rights holder is entirely irrelevant when determining the scope of corporate rights under the U.S. Constitution.3
It has even been argued that the United States is the only country in the
world providing for corporate personhood in a constitutional context.4 But
while the United States has become well-known for its long-standing tradition and leading role with regard to promoting corporate personhood, the
notion of corporate personhood is not a uniquely American one.
The notion that the United States has an exclusive hold on corporate
personhood is a common misperception, particularly with regard to Europe.
Granted, unlike in the United States, the manifestations of corporate per1

Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (Waite, C.J.) (emphasis added).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Editorial, The Broad Reach of the Narrow Hobby Lobby Ruling, L.A.
TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinsky-hobby-lobby-supreme
-court-20140701-story.html; Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-aredefining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted_all&_r_0; Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby Lobby in Constitutional Waters: Two Life Rings and an Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2014).
3
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (referring to “the premise
that the First
Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity); id. at
364 (holding that “[t]he First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech); see also id.
at 376.
4
Rob Kall, Is the USA the Only Nation in the World with Corporate Personhood?, ECONOMY IN
CRISIS (Apr. 10, 2012), http://economyincrisis.org/content/is-the-usa-the-only-nation-in-the-world-withcorporate-personhood (quoting Mila Versteeg) (last visited March 15, 2014)
2
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sonhood have traditionally been more tentative in European legal systems,
especially in civil law jurisdictions. This is illustrated vividly by the traditional resistance of European civil law systems to hold corporations criminally liable (as legal persons) under their domestic criminal codes.5 It may
seem like a natural progression that European legal systems, which have
been holding firm on the doctrine of societas delinquere non potest,6 also
would have conceptual troubles acknowledging corporations, as fictional
entities, to be holders of constitutional, fundamental, or even human rights.
In fact, even though many EU member states have been reluctant to confer
entity liabilities and rights on corporations beyond the context of civil and
commercial matters,7 their domestic courts generally have not barred corporations, as legal persons, from procedural safeguards and substantive rights
per se.8 Particularly the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Europe’s regional human rights court, has had a long history of extending the
fundamental rights guarantees under the European Convention on Human
Rights (the Convention)9 to corporations and has been the engine for a probusiness agenda of fundamental rights protections in Europe.10
Considering that both the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECHR have exercised a proactive approach to corporate rights, a comparative analysis of
commonalities and differences in methodology can shed light on how much
“corporate” there still is in corporate personhood on each side of the Atlantic and what lessons the two systems can learn from one another. It is imperative that the distinction between corporations and human beings be restored and reinforced through the law. It is simply not sufficient, with
reference to “corporate personhood,” merely to equate corporations with
human beings without accounting for the special characteristics of the corporate form, in terms of fiduciary duties, and the possible intra-corporate
tensions resulting from the separation of ownership and control. This article
argues that instead it is crucial to account for the characteristics and com5

Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us about American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 105 (2004).
6
“A legal entity cannot beblameworthy.”
7
Thus, whereas corporations have standing to sue and be sued in civil matters in nearly every jurisdiction, civil law systems (especially in Europe) have been traditionally been reluctant to provide for
corporate entity liability in the context of criminal proceedings.
8
However, constitutional rights protections under their respective domestic Constitutions have been
applied to corporations in a manner that is far more restrictive than in the United States. See Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2000, 102 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 591, 2001 (Ger.).
9
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950 C.E.T.S. No. 194 (entered into force June 1,
2010) [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention entered into force on September 3, 1953; to date 47
European states are party to the Convention. The Convention provides the treaty basis for the European
human rights regime that has aims to ensure compliance with basic human rights principles throughout
Europe. See PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 891–92 (2013).
10
MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES 134–35 (2006).
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plexities of corporate structures when determining if respective rights protections are applicable to corporations.11 Only then can conflicts with shareholder interests—as the primary constituency of the corporation—be mitigated and unintended consequences pertaining to corporate personhood be
avoided.
Corporations are considered entities in their own right,12 yet they can
only act through their agents, while owing a fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders.13 Thus, it is erroneous to think of a corporation in a onedimensional way, either in terms of an association of individuals or as a
person in its own right. Instead, corporations should be perceived as having
features of both associations and individuals, at least for the exercise of determining the scope of fundamental rights granted to the corporate entity.
Conferring rights on corporate entities acknowledges them as “independent
entit[ies] with interests, ends, and knowledge of its own.”14 Even if one
does not go as far as viewing the corporations as an “enforcement agent” of
their human constituents’ rights/interests,15 it still cannot be ignored that
corporations constitute a complex structure of a multitude of diverse interests that can conflict with one another and that need to be balanced.
This analysis can extend well beyond avoiding conflict between the
rights conferred on the corporate entity and the interests of its shareholders
to include interests of a company’s key stakeholders16 as well. Certainly,
this would require a stakeholder-centric corporate objective and governance
11

See Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
95, 108 (1995) (arguing that the respective theory of the nature of the corporation has “implications for
the nature and extent of corporate constitutional rights.”); Daniel Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why
Corporate Speech is not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1024 (suggesting that “[i]f corporate speech is to be
corporate at all, there must be a clear explanation of how the group decision legitimately can be made.”)
12
See generally Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (1994).
13
See Daniel Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees,
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1996).
14
David Ciepley, Neither Persons nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 1 J.L. & CTS. 221, 223 (2013).
15
Burt Neuborne, Of “Singles” Without Baseball: Corporations as Frozen Relational Moments, 64
RUTGERS L. REV. 769, 775 (2012).
16
There is some variety in how authors have defined the term “stakeholder.” As Donaldson & Preston note regarding a leading example:
The much-quoted Stanford Research Institute’s (SRI) definition of stakeholders as “those
groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist” clearly implies that
corporate managers must induce constructive contributions from their stakeholders to accomplish their own desired results (e.g., perpetuation of the organization, profitability, stability, growth).
Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence,
and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 72 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
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model under the law of the respective domestic jurisdiction, which has traditionally not been the case in the United States17 but increasingly has taken
hold in European legal systems, such as the UK, France, and Germany.18
Yet, while it is crucial to account for potential corporate entity-constituent
conflicts, there is no one-size-fits-all approach about how to deal with such
conflicts—these are inherent in the corporate form and its very nature. Rather, it depends on the prerogatives of the respective legal system how the
entity’s and constituents’ interests ought to be balanced. While in the United States statutory and common law protections might be effective to address these conflicts,19 different solutions at the constitutional level might
be necessary in other jurisdictions, depending on their respective legal culture and the statutory protections available for corporate constituents, namely, shareholders and other stakeholders.20
A transatlantic comparative legal analysis vividly illustrates the role of
corporate legal theory (about the nature of the firm) in the corporate rights
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the lack thereof in the case
law of Europe’s “Supreme Court” and its regional human rights court. The
European courts have featured a strictly teleological approach, thus avoiding issues of nature of the corporation, ignoring the diversity of shareholder
(and stakeholder) interests and glossing over potential intra-corporate conflicts. U.S. doctrine, on the other hand, is much more nuanced, both historically and in a contemporary setting. Thus, the Supreme Court has employed
a protection rationale that acknowledges shareholder interests as being distinct and possibly in conflict with the rights of the corporate entity itself,
while the jurisprudence in Europe does not account for this potential clash
of interests. In its decision in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court further extended its protection rationale to other stakeholders holding that “the pur17

See Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (installing the theory of shareholder
wealth maximization as a basic feature of corporate law); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits
in the Public Interest, 80 NYU L. REV. 733, 763–76 (2005) (giving an account of the case law and statutory law in the United States providing for managerial discretion to take into account the interests of
constituencies other than shareholders, for example, under constituency statutes and antitakeover laws).
In contrast, the majority opinion in the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Hobby Lobby includes language that points towards a stakeholder-sensitive corporate purpose. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
18
See MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 126
(2009).
19
The majority opinion in Citizens United dismisses Austin’s shareholder protection rationale by
holding that “[t]here is . . . little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the
procedures of corporate democracy,’” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62
(2010) (citation omitted), by which, “presumably the Court means the rights of shareholders to vote and
to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary duty,” id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20
See, e.g. Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Roell, Corporate Law and Governance, in 2
HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 830 (2007); Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance
Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117 (2007); see generally THE DERIVATIVE
ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE & FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (D. W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012).
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pose of extending rights to corporations is to protect the rights of people associated with the corporation, including shareholders, officers, and employees.”21
Having been faced with the issue whether “a for-profit corporation [is
allowed] to deny its employees the health coverage of contraceptives . . . ,
based on the religious objections of the corporation’s owners,”22 the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby has again taken on the fundamental question
of the corporate theory underpinnings of the corporate personhood doctrine.
Does a company, as a proxy of its shareholders’ interests, have beliefs and
intrinsic values after all? Or ought the religious beliefs and interests of
shareholders be viewed as distinguishable from the corporate entity itself?
Is the purpose of the corporate fiction to protect human beings, namely the
shareholders and other stakeholders (such as employees) associated with the
corporation?23 These and related questions inform the American legal analysis while the European Courts in their corporate rights jurisprudence are
entirely silent on these fundamental questions that go to the very nature of
the corporation.
Taking a look to Europe, this article examines what happens when the
essence of corporate personhood is ignored. Many would agree that more
rights (and more speech) are better,24 but it is also commonly understood
that rights can clash with the rights of others, i.e., to grant rights to one person naturally cuts back on the rights of others. The same is true in a corporate context providing one recognizes the corporation from the perspective
of its constituents. The danger of not recognizing this is well illustrated in
Europe.
A sharp contrast emerges between Europe and the United States on the
essential elements requires in examining corporate personhood. The ECHR
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (together, European Courts) have
outright ignored corporate theory and related questions of the nature of the
firm from the start. Both European Courts have granted the same guarantees
to corporations as to individual persons without accounting for legal principles about the nature of the corporation in general.25 In contrast, the Su21

While the majority opinion recognizes the need to protect interests of other stakeholders, in the
end, the Court’s decision was guided merely by the interests of the controlling shareholder of the closed
corporation in question. In dissent, J. Ginsburg criticizes the majority opinion for “accommodation of a
for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on third
parties who do not share the corporation owners’ religious faith-in these cases, thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
23
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
24
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 472 (2010) (citing Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
25
See generally Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990); Société Colas Est
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preme Court, while not always finding the corporate nature of the rights
holder decisive,26 does not turn a blind eye to the to the nature, organizational structures, and intra-institutional dynamics of the corporation.27 In the
United States, corporate theory is an important factor in the corporate personhood debate, as seen both within legal doctrine and in dissents and concurrences challenging majoritarian teleological approach. This has had the
effect of deepening the analysis of corporate personhood in the United
States, something that is lacking in Europe as result of their atheoretical approach.28
Granted, the Supreme Court’s approach to corporate constitutional
rights can be perceived as not always coherent and even bifurcated with regard to the methodology applied.29 Whereas the Supreme Court explicitly
decided some cases based on corporate theory,30 it found in its decision in
Citizens United that the corporate nature of the rights applicant is irrelevant.31 However, the Supreme Court exhibits an awareness of potential intra-corporate conflicts throughout its case law that is part of a robust debate,32 which is absent in the jurisprudence of its European counterparts.
The United States has often been looked to as a model for constitutional design. Even though some scholars have argued that America’s leading role is
diminishing in that regard,33 the Supreme Court’s methodology on corporate constitutional rights, far more advanced than the European approach,
can be seen as a north star for Europe.
There is a great need to recalibrate how we understand corporations
and what rights are vested in them. This holds true especially in Europe,
where recent developments have amplified the need for the high-level European Courts to reach clarity on the exactly those questions. With the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights became primary EU
law and thus provides constitutional-like protections to all EU citizens from
EU acts and legislation.34 Much of the case law of the ECHR is now expected to be imported into the judicial decision-making process of the ECJ,
and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2002).
26
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62; First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
27
See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788; see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (2010); see Hobby Lobby
Stores, 134 S.Ct. at 2768 (2014).
28
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 146.
29
See Carl Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L. J., 577, 622, 629 (1990).
30
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–76 (1906) ; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652
(1950).
31
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350, 376 (2010).
32
See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 805–08 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 475–79 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33
Kall, supra note 4 (quoting Milla Versteeg).
34
JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 146–59 (2010).
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as the highest EU court.35 In the wake of these developments towards an
EU-centric regime of fundamental rights, many questions about the scope
of those rights have gained increased importance, especially with regard to
the beneficiaries of such protections. In 2009, Intel surprised the legal
community in Europe by invoking the due process protections under the
Convention as a defense to the EU’s anti-trust proceedings against the software giant.36 The Wall Street Journal shortly thereafter postulated the following oxymoron: “Do corporations have human rights?”37
Europe is finding itself at a crossroads with regard to corporate personhood and how it manifests itself. The situation at the European level gets
further complicated by the reality that, since the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ and
the ECHR have overlapping jurisdiction over fundamental rights protection
in Europe.38 Since the concurrent relationship between both courts is not
formally defined, it remains unclear what would happen in case of divergent case law between the two courts.39 In light of these new realities in Europe, the need for a coherent and workable methodology with regard to corporate fundamental rights under the treaty regime is indispensable,
especially since signs of a divergence between the ECJ and the ECHR on
the subject have already become apparent.40 This article demonstrates why
European Courts should draw upon some of the thinking and analysis that
has arisen in the United States on corporate rights in a constitutional context. However, while the Supreme Court provides a workable methodology
that is much more nuanced than the one employed by its European counterparts, the justices do not always appear entirely coherent in drawing a clear
distinction between corporations and human beings.
This article explains how a detailed comparative analysis of the juris35

See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European
Court of Human Rights after Lisbon, in THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU AFTER
LISBON 153, 161 (Sybe de Vries et al eds., 2013).
36
See Editorial, Intel’s Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/08/17/opinion/17mon2.html.
37
Alan Riley, Do Companies Have Human Rights?: EU antitrust law may violate due process
rules, WSJ.COM (July 28, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203609
204574314333538014034 (last visited March 15, 2014).
38
See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court
of Human Rights after Lisbon, 153, 161, 165, in THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU
AFTER LISBON (Sybe de Vries et al eds., 2013); Butti, The Roles and Relationship between the Two
European Courts in Post-Lisbon EU Human Rights Protection, JURIST: Dateline (Sept. 12, 2014, 2:30
PM), http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/09/elena-butti-lisbon-treaty.php.
39
See Laurent Scheek, The Relationship Between the European Courts and Integration Through
Human Rights, 65 HEIDELBERG J. INTL. L. 837, 854 (2005)
40
See generally Jaanika Erne, Discourse Upon the Constituent Human Rights Developments in the
European Union, 12 JURIDICA INTL. 80 (2007); Lorena Rincon-Eizaga, Human Rights in the European
Union: Conflict Between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts Regarding Interpretation of Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 11 REV. COLOMB. DERECHO INT. BOGOTA 119 (2008)
(Colom.).
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prudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Courts can inform
both a European way forward that is reflective of the complexities of the
corporate form, and can also fill in the blanks in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate personhood. Section I examines the history of corporate personhood in Europe and the United States and illustrates that the doctrine needs to be understood as a product of the legal context of its time.
Section II takes a comparative look at the contemporary corporate personhood doctrine in Europe and the United States and defies the conventional
wisdom in legal scholarship of a shared trans-Atlantic pragmatism that ignores the “corporate” in corporate personhood. Section III then illustrates
the importance of corporate theory (about the nature of the firm) to avoid
intra-corporate conflicts with competing shareholder and stakeholder interests within the corporate personhood doctrine. Conducting an in-depth
comparative legal analysis, this section demonstrates the role of corporate
theory (and a protection rationale) in the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court and the lack thereof in the jurisprudence of the European Courts. Section IV concludes with the normative implications of a corporate theoryinformed approach, in Europe in terms of a doctrinal shift and enhanced institutional cooperation between the high-level European courts and the
member states, and in the United States in terms of a refocused doctrinal
methodology.
I. THE TRANSATLANTIC HISTORY OF CORPORATE
PERSONHOOD
Understanding corporate personhood as a product of its time, rather
than as an abstract legal construct that emerged in a legal vacuum, is crucial
when conducting a comparative analysis of different legal systems. This
section will show that the historical context can help explain the prevailing
differences between legal systems and provide guidance on what aspects of
one legal system’s methodology might successfully translate into the practice of another jurisdiction.
Unlike in the United States, the manifestations of corporate personhood have traditionally been more tentative in European legal systems, especially in civil law jurisdictions. While European states have been reluctant to confer entity liabilities and rights on corporations beyond the context
of civil and commercial matters, the United States has long made the leap to
endow corporations with personhood in a way that imposes far-reaching liabilities as well as rights.41 In this section, we first examine early American
jurisprudence about the structure of the corporations. The second subsection
then demonstrates the implications of the democratization of incorporation
for the American legal doctrine on corporate personality. Finally, the Amer41
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ican legal history of corporate personhood is contrasted with the European
experience that has traditionally been coined by tentativeness towards the
notion of corporate personality and has recently resulted in institutional tensions between the high-level European Courts and the member states.
A. The “Artificial Entity” as a Structural Limitation on Government
The early corporate personhood jurisprudence by the Supreme Court
was guided mainly by an effort to bring corporations under the tenets of
federal courts and federal common law and remove corporations from the
prerogatives of the states.42 This “federalist” agenda in sensu lato has dominated much of the 19th century jurisprudence on the issue by the Court. As
early as 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged corporations as “beings” in their own right, even if “artificial” ones. In its famous Dartmouth
College decision, the Court applied the Contract Clause to corporations,
thereby confirming their right to contract and freedom from impairment by
the state in their contractual relationships.43 In Dartmouth College, the
Court held that the corporate charter granted by the government (here the
Crown) was a contract under the U.S. Constitution. This landmark case was
the first important milestone in American legal history to emancipate the
corporate form and ensure its very existence based on its charter, without
any state being able to alter the terms of a corporate charter unilaterally after it was granted.44
Another line of early case law dealt with the legal nature of the corporation, in a different context, though. Thus, the Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether a corporation was a “citizen” for Article III
diversity jurisdiction purposes in its 1809 decision in Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux.45 At the time, the Court was not ready to embrace the
idea of corporate citizenship as a freestanding legal concept. It therefore
held in Deveaux that a corporation derives its citizenship from the citizenship of its shareholders, rather than from its state of incorporation or principal place of business.46 This made it difficult for corporations to satisfy the
requirement of complete diversity that would open up federal courts as a litigation forum for corporations.47
The question of corporate citizenship under the meaning of Article III
jurisdiction was of significant strategic importance since it was the lynchpin
42

See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 782.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 576 (1819) (interpreting the Contract Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1).
44
Id. at 573.
45
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 67 (1809).
46
Id. at 61, 91–92 (holding that, for jurisdictional purposes, the courts should “look to the character
of the individuals who compose the corporation.”)
47
See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 782–83.
43
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upon which access to federal courts, as a neutral federal judicial forum, was
grounded in federal common law.48 Eventually, the Court made the leap in
its 1844 decision in Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston Railroad v. Letson
that a corporation was a citizen of its state of incorporation for purposes of
Article III jurisdiction.49 These early efforts to capture the personification of
the corporation were still rather tentative and did not grant full-fledged personhood, or even citizenship, to corporations under the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution.
The underlying premise of the Supreme Court’s dealing with questions
about the nature of the corporation during this era, was not to construe corporations as persons or citizens under the Constitution in general but merely
in the context of constitutional provisions that would limit the states’ power, both judicially and otherwise, over the corporate form.50 Corporate personhood during the era of Chief Justice Marshall therefore needs to be understood in terms of a structural limitation on the government, rather than a
conferral of rights on the corporation.51 In that vein, the Court perceived
corporations as “mere creatures of law” and as such subject to government
regulation.52 This understanding by the Supreme Court traces back to the
special chartering power that was vested in the state at the time. Accordingly, incorporation was a privilege that was granted by the state legislature
upon application for a corporate charter.53
B. The Corporate Personification as a Function of the
Democratization of Incorporation
A major shift has occurred during the second half of the 19th century,
when the process of incorporation became “democratized” and special chartering was replaced by general incorporation.54 This development has had
important implications for the increasing personification of the corporation
under the law. At the time, the modern business corporation became increasingly available to a broad public as an “investment vehicle with per48

See id. at 782.
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 557–59 (1844).
50
See Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 173, 184–85 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1641–42 (1988); Mayer, supra note 29, at 580–81.
51
See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 208 (1990) (discussing the
“regulatory notion of corporate law” during the 19th century); Ribstein, supra note 9, at 97–99; Thomas
Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (& Market) Failure, & Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV.
273, 280–81 (1991).
52
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
53
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 390–91 (3d ed. 2005); see also
Ribstein, supra note 11, at 98.
54
See Hovenkamp, supra note 50, at 1634–35 (discussing how the incorporation process became
“democratized” at that time).
49
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petual life, limited liability, and entity-shielding.”55 In more and more
states, incorporation was no longer a legislative matter, but rather the corporate form could be created through a simple administrative procedure by
anyone who was interested in conducting business.56 Consequently, incorporation became a right of many, rather than a privilege of the few. The rise
of general incorporation profoundly changed the legal conception of the
corporation57 as it undermined the premise of Dartmouth holding that the
corporation is an “artificial being” and “a mere creation of the law.”58 The
changes of the social and economic conditions in the late 19th century significantly paved the way for the emergence of a new theory in corporate
law59 that views the corporation as “a natural product of private initiative,”60
rather than an “artificial creation of state law.” This led to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Santa Clara in 1886 where the Court held that a corporation is a “person” for the purpose of the equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment.61 The Court’s Santa Clara decision is considered as the
watershed moment in American legal history for the personification of the
corporation in its own right and can be considered the beginning of corporate personhood as we understand it today, namely in terms of the application of the Bill of Rights to corporations.62
Santa Clara provided the basis for constitutional challenges by corporations against the increasing state regulation of the Progressive Era. But it
was particularly the Supreme Court’s approach in Lochner63 that effectively
complemented the corporation’s 14th Amendment rights against state regulation by reading substantive due process protections into it.64 “For the next
fifty years, under the banner of substantive due process, and in the guise of
‘persons,’ corporations challenged Progressive era regulation . . . .”65 During both the Lochner era and the subsequent New Deal era, corporations did
not focus on making claims of corporate personality in an effort to assert
the Bill of Rights. Rather, there were other constitutional battles to be
fought until 1937, and at the center were the debate over economic due process rights and, during the New Deal, challenges against overbroad federal
55

See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 778.
See Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 75 (2005); FRIEDMAN, supra note 53 , at
390–91.
57
See Krannich, supra note 56, at 75–76; Liam Seamus O’Mellin, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 290–30 (2006).
58
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
59
See Morton Horwitz, supra note 50, at 184–85.
60
Millon, supra note 51, at 201.
61
Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886).
62
See Morton Horwitz, supra note 50.
63
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
64
See Mayer, supra note , at 588.
65
Id. at 588–89.
56
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regulatory powers. It is fair to say that “constitutional limitations on federal
regulatory power supplanted debates over corporate personhood.”66 Over
the course of the 20th century, the Court granted extensive rights to corporations that went well beyond the scope of commercial rights, in terms of
the right to property67 and the right to enter into contracts.68
The modern corporate form is very much a product of its history. The
analysis of the underlying dynamics that were instrumental in shaping the
emerging legal doctrine of corporate personality therefore informs a nuanced understanding of the corporate entity as a product of different socioeconomic conditions throughout history. While the “concession theory” has
lost much of its significance with the democratization of incorporation procedures,69 this stage in the history of corporations has left its traces that are
still prominent in contemporary corporate law.70 Thus, the corporate form is
not simply a “glorified partnership.”71 Rather, even today, many of its core
features, such as limited liability, entity shielding, and indefinite life are
created by the law and cannot be instituted simply through contracts.72 At
the same time, the shift to general incorporation has amplified the importance of the individual shareholders that can organize themselves in the
corporate form as an investment vehicle.73 Both strains in American corporate legal history have had a significant impact on how the law views corporations today. It is this multi-layered conception of the corporate entity that
has grown over time in American society and under the law and has influenced the long-standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on the issue.
C. Europe’s Tentativeness and the Troubled Relationship Between
its Courts
In contrast, the corporate rights jurisprudence of the high-level European Courts lacks any discussion about the nature of the corporation. There
might be many plausible and even congruent reasons that could account for
this neglect of corporate theory in Europe’s case law on corporate fundamental rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. One important factor certainly is the very different historical development of the
legal concept of corporate personality in Europe compared to the United
66

Id. at 598.
Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896).
68
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
69
See Millon, supra note 51, at 212. David Ciepley on the other hand makes a case for returning
“to the original theory of the corporation, which in its main points was undisputed for centuries, but
which has been out of favor since the end of the 19th century.” Ciepley, supra note 14, at 224.
70
See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 97.
71
Ciepley supra note 14, at 226.
72
See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 98.
73
See Millon, supra note 51, at 211; see also Krannich, supra note 56, at 72.
67

604

3KAEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/15 12:18 PM

Putting the “Corporate” Back
35:591 (2015)

States. In the legal systems of most EU member states and in the European
human rights system, the notion of the corporate entity as a person with its
very own rights and liabilities has not prospered as it has in the U.S. legal
system.74 Thus, it was only in the mid-1990s that the major European civil
law jurisdictions incorporated provisions for corporate entity liability into
their domestic criminal codes.75 Many European countries introduced corporate criminal liability provisions in the wake of implementing legislation
for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, fulfilling their responsibilities as parties to that treaty, even though the Rome Statute does
not require them to do so.76 However, even today and despite this overall
regulatory trend in Europe, there are still important outliers. For example,
Germany remains a “bastion” of the traditional principle societas delinquere non potest, with the result that under the German legal system a corporation as a legal person cannot be held criminally liable.77
While group rights are a well-established concept in many civil law jurisdictions in Europe,78 national courts have been more tentative than the
U.S. Supreme Court to grant constitutional rights to business corporations.79
Many European courts have taken issue particularly with constitutional
rights cases where the profit-driven and purely commercial nature of business corporations leads (de facto) to constitutional protection of mere economic activity.80 For example, the German Supreme Court held that com74

The Supreme Court confirmed as early as 1909 that federal criminal statutes applying to “persons” also extend to corporations. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481
(1909).
75
See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1481, 1493–94 (2009); see also Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability and the ICC
Statute: The Comparative Law Challenge, 56 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 333, 340–42 (2009).
76
See Supplemental Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14–20, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL
2165350 (providing a list of nations that have ratified the Rome Statute and where corporations are potentially exposed to criminal liability for atrocity crimes and pointing out that many of these nations introduced corporate criminal liability through the Rome Statute implementation process).
77
See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely
American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 142 (2008).
78
See, e.g., Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law] art.
19(3), May 23, 1949, BGBl. (Ger.) (“The basic rights shall also apply to domestic artificial persons to
the extent that the nature of such rights permits.”).
79
See Diskant, supra note 77, 129.
80
This tension is clearly visible where transnational courts, such as the European Court of Human
Rights, go against the rulings of domestic courts on interpretation of the Convention. See, e.g. Societe
Colas Est v. F UKr., 37971/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002, ¶¶ 41–42 (disagreeing with the French court and
holding that the right against violations of privacy extended not only to natural persons, but also to appellant corporations); Observer and Guardian v. U.K., 13585/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1991 ¶¶ 72–74 (holding
that Article 14, prescribing equal treatment of speech of persons by national origin, extended to news
corporations of different national origins); Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16,
¶¶ 47–48 (1990) (disagreeing with a Swiss court’s holding that freedom of expression extended only to
natural, not corporate, persons).
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mercial speech is only protected under the German Basic Law (German
Constitution) if the statement in question has a minimum political content,
not however if it is merely pursuing the economics interests of the speaker.81
Despite this reluctance at the national level, the ECHR and the ECJ
have broadly applied the human rights protections under the Convention to
corporations without addressing the corporate nature of the rights applicant.
Both courts have been equating corporations with persons within the meaning of the Convention with no or little corporate law analysis.82 This is even
more startling considering that the ECHR has persistently encountered resistance by member states such as Germany, France, and Switzerland,
which have argued in many instances that the corporate nature of the applicant and the commercial elements of the activity are relevant and do not fit
the underlying rationale of free expression and privacy under the Convention.83
In order to appease national voices of judicial activism,84 high-level
European Courts would be well advised to follow the lead of the Supreme
Court and look to corporate theory to inform their analysis about the applicability of fundamental rights provisions to business corporations. The
need to inject corporate theory about the nature of the firm into the constitutional analysis in Europe is an imminent one considering that the “personal”85 character of rights provisions is particularly prominent now in the human rights regime. After all, human rights are intrinsically linked to the
human dignity and liberty of human beings and do not extend easily to legal
persons, such as corporations.86
It is crucial therefore that the “corporate” be put back into corporate
personhood, especially in the context of a human rights regime. From an institutional cooperation perspective,87 consulting corporate theory to deter81

Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2000, 102
BVerfGE 347 (2000), 102 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 591, 2001 (Ger.) (holding that commercial speech is only protected under the German Basic Law [German Constitution] if the statement in
question has a minimum political content).
82
See Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2002); Hoechst AG v.
Commission Case 46/87 & 227/88 ECJ (1989) (noting that the principle laid down in Article 8 may be
regarded as applying not only to natural persons but also to legal persons).
83
See Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 25
(1989); Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 97, ¶ 27 (1993); Autronic AG v. Switzerland,
178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16, ¶ 44(2) (1990).
84
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 147.
85
As the U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out in its decision in FCC v. AT &T, Inc., the fact that
corporations are considered “persons” under the law, does not mean that they can hold “personal” rights.
The Courts states that “ ‘personal’ is often used to mean precisely the opposite of [something that is]
business-related.” 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1178 (2011).
86
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 116–17.
87
See Alec Stone Sweet & Hellen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders, in
A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 3–30 (Hellen Keller
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mine the scope of corporate fundamental rights would provide an opportunity for the ECHR and the ECJ to bring their jurisprudence in line with
the approach by national judiciaries in the member states. By addressing the
question of the nature of the corporation in the context of corporate entity
rights, the (competing) interests of a company’s constituents—primarily its
shareholders and potentially also its stakeholders—will inform the analysis
and possibly the outcome. Thus, a “human face” would be put on the legal
abstraction of the corporate entity and thereby emphasize the group-feature
of corporations.
II. THE LOST “CORPORATE” PERSON: A SHARED
TRANSATLANTIC JUDICIAL PRAGMATISM?
At first sight, it seems that both American and European Courts share
an important common feature in their corporate personhood jurisprudence,
namely a judicial pragmatism that is informed by a teleological approach
rather than considerations of corporate theory. A closer analysis of the case
law, however, reveals that there is a significant divergence in legal approach on both sides of the Atlantic. Respectively, in U.S. courts, the “corporate” nature of the rights applicants is still an integral part of the ongoing
legal debate and thereby has significantly shaped the evolution of the doctrine of corporate personhood over time.
Looking at the scope of corporate fundamental rights protections, it is
common to the American and European legal tradition that commercial
rights like the right to property and the right to enter into contracts have always been considered applicable to corporations,88 while “human nature”
rights such as the right against self-incrimination and the right to life have
been considered “purely personal” or intrinsic to natural persons.89 Nevertheless, one can discover traction with regard to some rights in a crossjurisdictional comparison.
For example, the rights to privacy and freedom of expression have
been subject to much controversy on both sides of the Atlantic about
whether and to what extent such rights apply to corporate actors.90
Comparing the American and European juridical approaches to corporate speech and corporate privacy is particularly suited to illustrate the
commonalities as well as differences between both systems and the norma& Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008); see also Steven Greer, What’s Wrong with the European Convention
on Human Rights, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 680, 682 (2008).
88
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 110.
89
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (holding that “certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to
corporations and other organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been
limited to the protection of individuals.”) (internal citation omitted).
90
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 147.
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tive implications that follow. While the example of corporate speech shows
a glaring similarity in judicial interpretative approach, it provides only one
dimension to the trans-Atlantic comparison on the issue.
A closer look at the European and U.S. jurisprudence on corporate entity rights uncovers a doctrinal difference with important normative implications, namely the role of corporate theory or, in the case of the Europe,
the lack thereof in the analysis of the courts. Corporate theory (dealing with
the nature of the corporation and potential intra-corporate conflicts) informs
the discussion of the Supreme Court in its corporate speech jurisprudence
(and keeps appearing in the form of dissenting and concurring opinions),
even if corporate theory was eventually not considered decisive in First
Amendment cases for the reasons set forth below.91 The American case law
dealing with corporate privacy further amplifies the role of corporate theory
when determining the applicability of constitutional and fundamental rights
provisions to corporations.92
This section examines the Transatlantic divide on corporate personhood first by understanding the methodologies employed by American and
European legal systems. Then the divide between the two bodies of law is
analyzed with an eye to the role of corporate theory about the nature of the
firm.
A. The Apparent Transatlantic Conventional Wisdom: From
Ontology to Teleology
While traditionally in the United States corporate personality has been
a vehicle to ensure access of corporations to federal courts under diversity
jurisdiction premises,93 the driving force in Europe has been a broadly advanced human rights regime.94 Despite these very different historical contexts in which corporate personhood issues arose, the approach by the
ECHR and the Supreme Court is very similar in result and apparently also
in methodology when extending fundamental rights protection to corporations.95 Both courts have featured a pro-business line of jurisprudence and
have applied a broad set of constitutional rights in the United States and
fundamental rights in the EU to corporations.
Further, with regard to the methodology applied when determining the
applicability of rights protections to corporations, it seems that both courts
share many similarities. Their interpretation of respective rights guarantees
91

See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 803 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); FCC v. AT & T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
93
See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 557–59 (1844).
94
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 111 (showing that the ECHR has “settled on a surprisingly
favorable view of the applicability of the rights and entitlement to corporate claimants.”).
95
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 146 .

608

3KAEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/15 12:18 PM

Putting the “Corporate” Back
35:591 (2015)

is guided in both instances by “pragmatism” rather than theory.96 Both systems employ a practice of judicial pragmatism that determines the applicability of rights guarantees to corporations based upon whether such claims
would effectively advance the broader interests that the U.S. Constitution
and the European Convention on Human Rights seek to protect. Thus, the
question is not primarily framed as a matter of ontology,97 in terms of
whether corporations have rights, but rather as a matter of teleology,98 in
terms of what broader interests are served.99
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court early addressed the nature of the
corporation to inform the question of constitutional rights guarantees of
corporations.100 However, the recent case law of the Supreme Court seems
to signal a shift from “ontology to teleology” on the issue of corporate constitutional rights starting with its 1978 decision in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti (dealing with corporate election spending as a form of political speech). In its judgment, the Court explicitly elaborated that, in the
Court’s view, the “question . . . whether and to what extent corporations
have first amendment rights . . . pose[s] the wrong question. [Rather,] [t]he
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking
their vindication.”101 According to the Court, the broader interest protected
by the First Amendment is (political) speech as an indispensable element of
decision-making in a democratic society. “[T]his is no less true because the
speech comes from a corporation.”102
This interpretative approach was re-affirmed in Citizens United in
2010, where the Supreme Court held that the speaker’s corporate identity is
irrelevant and does not justify speech restrictions by the government.103 The
96

See Mayer, supra note 29, at 639; see also EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 134–37.
The “theory or conception relating to the nature of being” (in this case of the corporation), Ontology,
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/131551?
redirectedFrom=ontology&print (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
98
“The doctrine or study of ends or final causes.” Teleology, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/198710?redirectedFrom=teleology&print (last visited
Aug. 22, 2014)
99
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775–76 (1978) (holding that [political]
speech is “indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,” even if it is a corporation that speaks);
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 711, ¶ 53(3) (1979)
(holding that the Convention is “an Instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values
of democratic society”).
100
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–76 (1906) (granting Fourth Amendment protection to corporations since the latter are “but an association of individuals;” on the other hand, the Court held the right
against self-incrimination under the 5th Amendment inapplicable to corporations as corporations are
mere “creature[s] of the State,” what is a rendition of the artificial entity theory [i.e., concession theory]
rather than the previous natural entity theory [i.e., association theory]); United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
101
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775–76.
102
Id. at 777.
103
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364, 376 (2010).
97
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Court followed its line of reasoning from Bellotti that is grounded in the
underlying theory of the First Amendment suggesting that free speech advances democracy.104 On the premise of the democratic function of the free
speech clause, the Court construed the purpose of the First Amendment as
protecting the “open market place of ideas,” where ideas “may compete”
freely “without government interference.”105
This understanding places emphasis on speech as the protected prerogative of the First Amendment rather than the rights of the speaker, thus rendering the corporate identity of the rights applicant irrelevant for the analysis. Citizens United has been an important milestone in the Supreme Court’s
corporate rights jurisprudence. With its Citizens United decision, the Court
resolved a conflict between contradictory lines of precedent, namely “a preAustin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate
identity and a post-Austin line permitting them.”106 Unlike the Court’s previous decision in Bellotti, the Court made a shift in Austin towards accounting for the corporate identity of the speaker.
The Court based its decision in Austin on an “antidistortion” rationale,107 according to which government regulation is permissible in order
to contain the distortive effect of the business corporation on the “political
marketplace.”108 The Court did not only hold the corporate identity of the
speaker to be highly relevant; its decisions in Austin and then MCFL also
suggest a distinction in the corporate form that instructed the Court’s analysis and result. Thus, it distinguished between for-profit and non-profit corporations in the context of (electoral) political speech and upheld statutory
restrictions against the former but not the latter.109 The reasoning advanced
by the Court was the danger of “corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth” that exists with regard to the participation of for-profit corporations in the political arena whereas the same risks are not posed by nonprofit corporations despite their corporate form.110 The Court in Citizens United
rejected Austin’s anti-distortion rationale by overruling the judgment and on
104

Id. at 323.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208 (2008).
106
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 313.
107
See id. at 348 (stating that “[t]o bypass Buckley and Bellotti, the Austin Court identified a new
governmental interest in limiting political speech: an antidistortion interest”)
108
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)) (holding that “[the] state-created advantages
. . . permit [corporations] to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace.’” (emphasis added)), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
109
Austin, 494 U.S. at 661 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263) (emphasizing that nonprofit corporations
have “features more akin to voluntary political associations than business firms,” thus, statutory restrictions on their campaign finance spending are unconstitutional).
110
Id. at 660 (pointing to the “distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form”)
105
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the proposition voiced by Justice Scalia’s dissent in Austin, “that there is no
such thing as too much speech.”111 It thereby dismissed the “concern about
corporate domination of the political process”112 in favor of an unrestricted
marketplace of ideas.
Prominent First Amendment scholars, such as Martin Redish, have
supported this position in a free speech context arguing that “neither the
fact that expression has been paid for, nor the presence of an underlying
motivation of profit maximization detracts from the social, political, or constitutional values”113 of corporate speech. In fact, he reaffirms that “if money talks, then restricting the use of money in the expressive market place
silences.”114 The notion of adversary democracy, where unfettered political
speech between competing points of view should lead to good governance,
offers a compelling explanation for the Supreme Court’s position in Citizens United that negates the relevance of the corporate nature of the speaker
for First Amendment purposes. The theory of adversary democracy
acknowledges that democracy presupposes (in a descriptive and normative
manner) conflict between competing interests in society.115 It is exactly this
competition that helps people realize their self-ruling function in a democratic society.116
Rather than theories of collective democracy, which understand democracy as a cooperative pursuit of a “common will” or “general welfare,”117 the notion of adversary democracy is able to accommodate asymmetries between self-interested behavior and the public interest.118
Construing the normative purpose of the First Amendment in terms of adversary democracy therefore extends the scope of the constitutional guarantee to all speech even if “the speaker seeks to advance her own personal interests rather than those other public at large.”119 On this premise, also
inherently selfish speech, such as commercial speech, is protected since it
promotes diversity and competition of interests that can be considered a
catalyst for democracy.120 This provides a plausible reasoning for why the
Supreme Court dismissed the doctrine of the distortive effect of corporate
wealth (by overruling Austin).121
Still, while the corporate identity of the rights applicant has not been
deemed decisive in the case of corporate speech rights in Bellotti and Citi111

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 472 (2010) (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Austin, 494 U.S. at 659.
113
MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS 2 (2002).
114
Id. at 3.
115
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2013).
116
See id. at 2.
117
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
118
See REDISH, supra note 115, at 76–77.
119
REDISH, supra note 115, at 4.
120
Id. at 5.
121
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
112
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zens United, a more nuanced look reveals that the Court is not entirely
oblivious to corporate theory and the intrinsic characteristics of the corporation in its analysis either. Thus, in both cases the Court addresses the concern of competing interests of a company’s shareholders and how these
conflicts can be remedied.122 While the Court has dismissed the concern of
distortive effects of corporate speech on the external political process,
based on the underlying purpose of the free speech clause, it is often overlooked that the Court remains sensitive to the concern of intra-corporate
conflicts of competing interests. This holds true in the corporate speech
context and even more so with regard to corporate privacy claims. This perspective therefore provides important lessons for European Courts, currently wrestling with the prerogatives of corporate personhood. But it also provides some clarity in face of the perceived obscurity of the Supreme Court’s
treatment of corporate rights under the Constitution.123
As Section III will elaborate, this article argues that corporate theory is
relevant to inform the analysis on corporate personhood (and related entity
rights at a constitutional level) in order to avoid or mitigate intra-corporate
conflict in multi-shareholder corporations. Approaching corporate personhood through the lens of corporate theory prompts the question on what basis corporate directors and management can override the interest of their
shareholders and other constituencies. One might be hard pressed to find a
reason why a corporation should enjoy constitutionally protected rights that
are conflicting with competing shareholder interests. This is particularly
true for bill of rights that are non-commercial in their nature and do not protect corporate property. It seems questionable to argue that the separation of
ownership and control in the corporate form and the agency costs that
shareholders incur as a trade-off for benefits of the corporate form, such as
limited liability, might justify treating corporations as homogenous entities
in their own right under the Constitution while disregarding competing interests of their shareholders in that analysis. This proposition, as will be
shown below, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedents both preand post-Citizens United.

122

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787, 794–95 (1978) (discussing the “interest
in protecting the rights of shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by management on behalf of the corporation” as a justification for statutory restrictions on corporate speech and concluding
that shareholders are “competent to protect their own interests” by virtue of “the procedures of corporate
democracy”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361 (debating the government “interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political speech,” deferring again to intracorporate remedies for shareholders).
123
See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497 (2011); Krannich, supra note
56, at 62.
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B. The Transatlantic Discrepancy: Corporate Theory within
Corporate Personhood
The following sections will rebut this conventional wisdom that the
United States and Europe have embarked on the same path of a policyinformed judicial pragmatism in their corporate personhood jurisprudence
without recourse to corporate theory. Rather, the U.S. doctrine proves to be
much more nuanced with regard to the structural complexities of the corporate form. As will be shown below, in the preponderance of its opinions, the
Supreme Court has placed the emphasis where it should be: the nature of
the corporate structure itself.
While scholars have alleged that there is a common focus on teleology
rather than ontology in the corporate rights jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court and the ECHR,124 little attention has been given to potential differences in methodology, specifically the role of corporate theory or the lack
thereof in European jurisprudence. Unlike the Supreme Court, the ECHR
has followed a solely policy-oriented approach that does not account for the
nature of the corporation as a legal person with distinct attributes under the
law and with responsibilities towards its shareholders, as its main constituency. Thus, the ECHR has justified the applicability of the protections under the Convention merely on the basis of a test that asks whether the corporate claim is promoting and maintaining general Convention values,
without taking into account potential intra-corporate conflicts, especially
with regard to competing shareholder interests.125 By under-accounting for
the characteristics of the corporation, the ECHR has granted the same guarantees to corporations as to individual persons without any further examination. A discussion about the nature and structure of the corporation as a legal person and how it informs questions pertaining to the “human rights” of
corporate entities, is entirely missing in the jurisprudence of the ECHR.126
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has long been wrestling with
the corporate personhood question and how it might inform the applicability of constitutional protections under the Bill of Rights to corporations.127
The jurisprudence by the Supreme Court therefore provides a rich source
for lessons that can inform Europe’s approach in the realm of corporate
constitutional rights. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court’s
124

See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1496, 1496 (1975);
EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 146; see also Mayer, supra note 29, at 634.
125
The European Court on Human Rights has explicitly embraced a mode of interpretation that ensures that the right guarantees are “practical and effective” in a way that is promoting the underlying
values of the Convention. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21–22 (1981).
126
See Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2002); Autronic AG v.
Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44(2) (1990).
127
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–76
(1906).

613

3KAEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/15 12:18 PM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

35:591 (2015)

case law reveals that the role of corporate theory has not been reflected entirely accurately in the literature. Specifically, it will be shown that the jurisprudence of the Court does not signal a shift away from the ontology of
the corporation, but rather is emblematic of a methodology that is sensitive
to the corporate nature of the rights applicant and the multi-dimensional
character of the corporate form in light of the purpose of the respective
rights provision. Despite the dicta in Citizens United that “[n]o sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or
for-profit corporations,”128 the facts in this landmark case have not dealt
with multi-shareholder for-profit corporations.129 Therefore, even on the
premise of the majority opinion in Citizens United, it is still crucial to ask
the question how this ruling would impact for-profit corporations if it were
presented to the Justices. It would require a more sophisticated analysis
than the dicta of Citizens United offers.
III. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE THEORY
There is an important role that corporate theory about the nature of the
firm can play in the corporate personhood doctrine. Specifically, it can help
account for competing interests of shareholders and other stakeholders and
avoid intra-corporate conflicts within the doctrine, as subsection A examines. In subsection B, the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is examined with an eye towards the role of corporate theory in the legal analysis
and shows that corporate theory has been a consistent part of the Supreme
Court’s portfolio of methodologies for corporate personhood. Major cases
that are critical to this analysis include Citizens United, Bellotti, FCC v.
AT&T, Hale v. Henkel, Morton Salt, Hobby Lobby. This aim of resurrecting
shareholder and constituency protection within the corporate personhood
doctrine emerges as critical to account for the complex organizational nature of the corporate form. Finally, as examined in subsection C, the European experience demonstrates the negative consequences if the essence of
corporate personhood, in other words, the nature of the firm and the diversity of interests of its constituents, including shareholder and other stakeholders, is ignored.
A. Competing Interests of Corporate Constituents
While constitutional protections of corporate speech, documents, and
contracts have been looked at primarily through the lens of constitutional
law, several scholars have highlighted the importance of corporate theory to
address these and related issues. Thus, it has correctly been argued that
128
129
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solving questions relating to “the constitutional limits of government power
. . . often depends on how the corporation is characterized.”130 The choice of
corporate theory has important implications for the nature and scope of corporate constitutional rights.131
This poses the question what contemporary notion of the corporation
most accurately describes its unique characteristics and intra-structural dynamics. As elaborated above, the understanding and treatment of the corporate form is intrinsically situated in the socio-economic context of its time.
During much of the 19th century, the “concession theory” was dominating
the legal discourse on the nature of the corporation.132 Accordingly, the corporation was perceived as an artificial entity created by the state and endowed with the privilege of incorporation.133 In the early 19th century, the
Supreme Court described the corporation as “an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of the law” and as such “the
mere creature of law.”134 The rise of general chartering in numerous states
in the second half of the 19th century can be considered a watershed moment in the way legal theory viewed corporations. It marked an end to the
concession theory as the prominent legal doctrine with the new incorporation rules changing the very premise of this view that considered the corporation a mere artificial creation of the state at its discretion and with the
power to extensively regulate corporate activity.135 Democratizing access to
business corporations as investment vehicles with beneficial legal characteristics has had a lasting impact on corporate legal theory. Specifically, general incorporation acts “moved the predominant role in corporate organization from the state to the incorporators and shareholders.”136 The
democratizing effect of general incorporation rules has amplified the role of
shareholders as the primary constituency of the modern form of the business corporation.
The changes in incorporation rules gave rise to the association theory,
according to which a corporation is perceived and treated as a mere aggregation of its members, in terms of individual shareholders.137 While the association correctly, and most importantly, accounts for the constituent role
130

Ribstein, supra note 11, at 96.
See id. at 108.
132
See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1635–
131

40.

133

See Millon, supra note 51, at 202; see also William Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of
the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1989).
134
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
135
Some argue for a revival of the concession/grant theory. See Ciepley, supra note 14, at 224
(claiming that “the association theory and real entity theory are mistaken” and that the concession theory
provides the only coherent solution).
136
Philip Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 283, 293 (1990).
137
See Krannich, supra note 56, at 72.
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of the shareholders,138 it has been argued that it takes the metaphor of the
corporation as a mere aggregation of individual human beings too far.139
Contrary to what the association theory suggests, the corporation is not a
perfect partnership in the traditional sense,140 but rather sui generis in its
own nature and structure and with the intra-corporate dynamics that accompany it.141 Thus, unlike in a partnership, the corporation has a separate identity of its own: its contracts, property, and liabilities are separate from its
shareholders.142 It is hard to comprehend why this basic principle of corporate law should not also apply to the question of corporate rights in a constitutional context. Viewing the corporation merely as a proxy for its members
and their rights143 ignores the separate identity of the corporation under the
law.
After all, the corporate form disposes of some features that cannot possibly be established by means of private initiative (i.e., contracts) between
individual members, namely limited liability and entity shielding.144 Rather,
some of the unique characteristics of the corporation that set it apart from a
partnership exist only by virtue of statutory law.145 The Supreme Court has
displayed this understanding about the nature of the corporate form on several counts. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court de138

See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 774 (arguing that “corporate personality is merely a . . . metaphor for a complex set of underlying human activities and relationships”)
139
See Greenwood, supra note 13, at 1022 (pointing to the “aggregation problem” in terms that
“[t]he decision of a group . . . can be quite different from the decisions of the members taken individually.”)
140
See Ciepley, supra note 14, at 226; see also Greenwood, supra note 11, at 15 (suggesting that
corporate speech is not merely “an instance of ordinary group speech”).
141
See Greenwood, supra note 13, at 1032, 1042 (identifying the agency problem within the corporation as function of the fiction of that “the profit motive [is] the primary reason investors participate,”
thus ignoring the “diversity of shareholders” and their interests. In other words, arguing that much of the
intra-corporate conflicts result from the fact that “corporate speakers are agents answerable to a principle, not a principal.” [emphasis added]; see also Ribstein, supra note 11, at 99 (suggesting that the separation of ownership and control has the effect “that corporate property will not be used efficiently unless
the managers are subject to special legal constraints”).
142
The notion of the corporate person as its own entity is still prevalent even after the demise of the
“concession theory” at the end of the 19th century. The end of the government’s chartering authority did
not mark the end of corporate person theory, as recent Supreme Court jurisprudence confirms. See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 98; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354–55
(2010) (treating the corporate entity as a “speaker” under the 1st Amendment.); United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (emphasizing that corporations “are endowed with public attributes
[and] have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial
entities”).
143
Neuborne, supra note 15, at 788 (describing “corporate personality as a centralized enforcement
agent” for the “interests of decentralized corporate shareholders”).
144
Proponents of the “contractual theory” on the other hand, view the corporation as a mere nexus
of contracts. See generally Henry Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEORGE
MASON UNIV. L. REV. 99. See also BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1995).
145
See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 98.
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scribed the corporation as a “unique state-conferred . . . structure” that disposes of special features such as “limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets.”146 Also, in
Morton, the Court emphasizes the “public attributes” that the corporation
derives from the state.147
There is a range of corporate governance theories that address the
question about how to balance corporate decision-making between management and shareholders. According to the theory of shareholder primacy,
managers are considered their agents of the shareholders in running the
business, which results in the fiduciary duty of corporate managers to further the interests of shareholders, often paired with a call by scholars and
commentators for increasing shareholder governance powers within the
corporation.148 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, on the other hand, argue in
favor of a “team production” theory that treats directors as “‘mediating hierarchs’ whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests” thereby serving the interests of the entire corporate entity.149 While some have
proposed a theory of director primacy that confers broad discretion on management in the pursuit of pure shareholder value maximization,150 Blair and
Stout allow management to take into account non-shareholder interests in
their decision making process.151
These theories illustrate the spectrum of views on the power allocation
within the corporation. However, there is a clear common thread that becomes apparent. Under these theories, the interests of shareholders guide
management decision-making in the modern corporation, but the theories
differ on the extent of management’s independence. It is therefore fair to
say that modern corporate law is premised on the pursuit of shareholder interests,152 while at the same time acknowledging the corporation as an entity
created by private initiative and market forces.153 This leads to complex intra-corporate dynamics and competing interests within the corporate form
that need to be accounted for when dealing with the question of constitu146

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658, 660 (1990). While the Supreme
Court overruled Austin, finding the anti-distortion rationale does not hold, the case still provides useful
guidance as to how the Court views the nature and structure of the corporation.
147
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652.
148
See generally Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992).
149
Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,
291 (1999).
150
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601, 604 (2006).
151
Blair & Stout, supra note 149, at 253
152
See Einer Elhauge, supra note 17, at 735–36; MICHAEL DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF
CORPORATION LAW 97 (1995); ADOLF BERLE JR. & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220–32 (1932).
153
See Millon, supra note 53, at 202–203.
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tional rights of corporations.
While the Supreme Court in Citizens United has overruled Austin’s anti-distortion rationale that deals with the impact of corporate wealth on society in a democratic system, the impact on the interests of shareholders still
requires a thorough examination by the courts. Simply extending rights to
corporations as if they were natural persons would ignore a major complexity that is inherent in the very nature and design of the corporation, i.e.,
the legal separation of the corporate entity and its shareholders. In order to
shed light on the question whether and to what extent corporations should
have constitutional rights, it is crucial first to recognize that the corporation
is not a homogenous entity but it is characterized by internal dynamics and
potentially competing interests.154 Those intra-corporate tensions trace back
to the separation of ownership and control within the corporate governance
structure. Thus, “modern corporate law, by locating the center of corporate
authority in a board of directors . . . , makes clear that the shareholders . . .
have no right to run the corporation or determine its goals.”155
This separation creates opportunities for abuse of power by corporate
management that requires checks and balances in the form of legal constraints.156 The fiduciary duty owed by management to the corporation, and
therefore ultimately to the shareholders, addresses this need. Against the
backdrop of this inherent tension in the corporate form, one should pause
before arguing that that competing shareholder interests could simply be
overridden without a thorough analysis of remedies available for shareholders, especially minority ones. While it is the common understanding that the
benefits of using the corporate form as an investment vehicle come at a
price,157 namely in the form of agency costs, this rationale does not easily
extend to or even hold true with regard to non-commercial aspects, such as
political speech or privacy prerogatives of the corporate entity. Daniel
Greenwood characterizes the questions pertaining to corporate speech as a
special form of an agency problem in terms of “role morality.”158 He claims
that traditionally, “[a]gency cost theory . . . treats the interests of shareholders as deeply unproblematic and deeply antipolitical.”159 Corporate law operates on the fiction that shareholders are entirely “monolithic” and therefore are only motivated by one single-unified goal, profit maximization, and

154

Neuborne, supra note 15, at 789 (about “intracorporate conflicts” in multishareholder corporations.) See also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561 (2006).
155
Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1007–08.
156
See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 96, 99.
157
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976).
158
Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1038.
159
Id. at 1040.
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the economic return on their investment.160 In the context of corporate
speech, Greenwood describes this legal phenomenon accurately by stating
that “[c]orporate speakers are agents answerable to a principle [i.e., the primacy of the profit motive of shareholders], not a principal [i.e., the shareholders with their actual values and interests].”161
While this seems appropriate when management makes business decisions that are primarily commercial in nature, it raises serious questions
when the corporation is entering the “political market place” by virtue of
corporate speech or is exercising other non-commercial bill of rights, such
as privacy.162 Shareholders cannot be seen as part of the legal fiction of a
unified and single goal of profit maximization, but rather should be conceived as part of a group of individuals with diverse values and interests,
economic and otherwise, which can significantly deviate from management’s interests.163 Greenwood puts it concisely when he explains that
“[t]he humans who stand behind the shares have various and conflicting
goals, as all people do: they want their shares to increase in value, of
course, but they may also want decent jobs for their kids or neighbors, attractive and safe cities, a clean environment, and other things that, from
time to time, conflict with the increase in value of their shares.”164 Unlike
when the corporation makes ordinary investment decisions, where management is enjoying great discretion under the “business judgment rule,” a
different standard seems necessary when the corporation is claiming political rights as a citizen under the constitution.165 In this instance, corporations
should be treated like a legal group (rather than a fiction), when determining whether and to what extent corporations can claim constitutional or
fundamental rights that were originally and traditionally intended for natural persons.
It is crucial that corporate theory about the nature of the firm informs
the debate on corporate constitutional rights so that competing interests of
shareholders are taken into account and intra-corporate conflicts are avoided. European courts in particular need to recognize corporations as complex
organizational creatures with different constituents and a diversity of interests that can be aligned but that can also be at odds with each other. Failing
to do that can lead to intra-corporate conflicts resulting from the diversity of
shareholder and other stakeholder interests that can be at odds with the interests of management, especially when we are talking about extending
non-commercial rights to corporations.
160

Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1042.
162
See Ciepley, supra note 14, at 225.
163
See Iman Anabtawi, supra note 156 (arguing that the largest modern shareholders have private
interests that are both substantial and in conflict with maximizing overall shareholder value.)
164
Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1040–41.
165
See id. at 1019.
161
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The existence of competing shareholder interests does not necessarily
and automatically require barring corporations from rights protections under the Bill of Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights all together. Rather, a detailed and critical analysis of the available remedies for
shareholders under the respective legal or economic systems is required.
B. The Relevance of the Corporate Identity in U.S. Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
The corporate personhood debate has a long history in the practice of
the U.S. Supreme Court. Citizens United can be understood as a watershed
moment, where the Supreme Court solved the tension between different
(contradictory) strands of its precedents concerning corporate speech restrictions. The Court described the dilemma that it was facing: “[This]
Court is thus confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin
line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”166 Looking at the
last century of the Court’s case law, some commentators have argued that
the Court’s debate on the status of corporations under the Constitution increasingly has moved away from an analysis that is informed by ontology
and thus by corporate theory.167 Indeed, Citizens United explicitly overturned Austin and thus “returns to the principle established in Buckley and
Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech based on the
speaker’s corporate identity.”168
Citizens United can be seen as the penultimate manifestation of corporate personhood on the premise that the corporation is a real/natural entity
with its own “voice.”169 On its face, one might conclude that Citizens United (and its reference to Bellotti) achieved total rights equality between corporations, as legal persons, and natural persons. The corporate identity of
the speaker is perceived as irrelevant and does not justify speech restrictions.170 Rather, corporate speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to show that the statutory restriction
“furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”171
In the discussion below, we explore American jurisprudence that defines corporate personhood. Five landmark cases chart the reasoning of the
166

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 313 (2010).
See, for example, Mayer, supra note 29, at 629–51 (arguing the “demise of corporate theory” and
the Court’s interpretative shift “from theory to pragmatism”).
168
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315.
169
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, WISCONSIN L. REV. 999, 1040
(2010).
170
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364, 376.
171
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 546 U.S. 410, 464 (2007).
167
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Supreme Court. Citizens United and FCC v. AT&T reveal that the Court’s
methodological approach is coherent with regard to the application of corporate theory in light of the narrow cases before it; a reasoned analysis of
both cases demonstrates that (despite contrary voices in the scholarship)
corporate theory has not been abandoned in general by the Court. Hale v.
Henkel, Morton Salt, Bellotti, and Hobby Lobby further explain the role of
corporate theory (about the nature of the firm) as a common thread of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence over the course of the last century.
1. A Reasoned Understanding of Citizens United and FCC v. AT&T
However, despite contrary voices in the scholarship,172 no truly authentic conclusion can be drawn from Citizens United regarding the role of
corporate theory in the corporate personhood debate. It is not that the majority of justices would necessarily dispute the logic of putting the “corporate” back into corporate personhood, but they are simply reaching decisions on a different plane of analysis in the narrow case before them.
Citizens United does not mark a general course change in the conception of
corporate personhood, but it decides a specific case with facts that did not
require an in-depth examination of corporate theory and competing interest
of shareholders.173
The decisive lynchpin that determines the Court’s methodology in this
case is the nature of the free speech right. In his dissent, Justice John Paul
Stevens concisely describes the majority opinion’s reasoning as follows:
Recognizing the weakness of a speaker-based critique of Austin, the
Court places primary emphasis not on the corporation’s right to electioneer, but rather on the listener’s interest in hearing what every
possible speaker may have to say. The Court’s central argument is
that laws such as § 203 have “deprived [the electorate] of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function,” [majority opinion, at 38], and this “interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas
protected by the First Amendment.”174

The lack of corporate theory in the analysis of the Court is consistent
with the purpose of the First Amendment as described by the Roberts Court
and First Amendment scholars, namely to protect speech rather than the
rights of the speaker.175 Thus, with this understanding of the First Amend172

See, e.g., Mayer supra note 29, at 629.
See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 79–92; Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 109–
10 (2014).
174
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175
See Martin Redish & Howard Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech
and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 237 (1998) (suggesting that
173
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ment as being non-speaker-centric leads to an analysis by the Court that is
not (heavily) informed by corporate theory simply because it is not decisive
in this case, i.e., in a free speech context under the U.S. Constitution.176
This does not mean, however, that the Court dismissed corporate theory in general and for all cases involving corporate constitutional rights.
Specifically, in its 2011 decision in Federal Communications Commission
v. AT&T177, the first corporate rights decision by the Court following Citizens United, the Court demonstrated that the corporate identity might not
always be irrelevant. Unlike Citizens United, this case dealt with corporate
privacy considerations against mandated disclosure of financial and other
business information under the Fourth Amendment. In its judgment in FCC
v. ATT, the Supreme Court follows in the footsteps of its early analysis in
Hale v. Henkel and Morton Salt, where the Court relied heavily on corporate theory in order to determine the scope and limits of corporate privacy
rights.178 In FCC v. AT&T, the Court re-focused on the nature of the corporation as a rights holder with a “formalist” and “linguistic analysis”179 that
points towards a disconnect between the notion of corporations as “persons” and the attribute of “personal” privacy.180 The Roberts Court rejected
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals that “‘personal’ must mean relating to
those ‘person[s]’ [as defined in the statute]: namely, corporations and other
entities as well as individuals.”181 Greenwood accurately restates the holding of the Court as follows: “In ordinary English usage, corporations do not
have ‘personal’ privacy. While the word ‘person’ often includes corporations in legal jargon, the adjective ‘personal’ does not carry that special
“[r]egardless of the expression’s source, such speech undoubtedly has the effect of aiding the selfrealization of the recipients of that expression.”); see also Citizens United, at 349 (majority opinion)
(reaffirming Bellotti byholding that “political speech is ‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation’”) (internal citation omitted);
see also Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and The Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 258 (2004).
176
See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775–76 (1978), which holds that the
“question whether and to what extent corporations have first amendment rights . . . pose[s] the wrong
question. [Rather,] [t]he Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their
vindication.”
177
FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131. S. Ct. 1177, 1177 (2011).
178
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1906) (focusing its analysis on corporate theory, the Court
employed the artificial entity theory to deny corporations fifth amendment protections, while granting
them fourth amendment protections based on the rational of the real entity theory. This Court has often
been criticized for this “schizophrenic view on corporate personality.” Mayer, supra note 29, at 621;
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (applying the artificial entity theory and
concluding that the privilege of incorporation from the government “carries with [it] an enhanced measure of regulation.”)
179
Daniel Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T: The Idolatry of Corporations and Impersonal Privacy, 2011
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ON-LINE, http://harvardlpr.com/online-articles/fcc-v-att-the-idolatry-ofcorporations-and-impersonal-privacy/.
180
FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1181.
181
Id. at 1181 (citing Brief of Resp. AT&T 8, 14–15).
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meaning. ‘Personal’ is the opposite of bureaucratic, impersonal, or business,
not its synonym, and ‘personal privacy’ never means ‘business secrets.’”182
The Court has taken a bifurcated approach to corporate personhood
under the Constitution, as manifested in the dichotomy between its early
case law in Hale v. Henkel and Morton Salt, and its decision in Bellotti and
its recent ruling in Citizens United. In the latter judgment, the Court followed an approach where the speaker is irrelevant and the applicability of
corporate rights is determined by a teleological approach. In light of the
Court’s linguistic analysis in FCC v. AT&T that hinges heavily on the nature of the corporation, Daniel Greenwood criticizes the Court’s perpetuating inconsistency as follows: “Why is ordinary meaning important here, but
irrelevant when corporations assert constitutional rights that the text grants
only to human beings?”183
The “free marketplace of ideas” paradigm under the First Amendment,184 which disregards the corporate nature of the rights holders, and the
“personal privacy” paradigm,185 which relies exactly on the corporate nature
of the rights holders, are not intrinsically inconsistent. Rather, how pronounced the corporate theory analysis is in each case depends on the extent
to which it is influenced by the underlying purpose of the respective Bill of
Rights provision.186
The First Amendment protects not only the “self-expression of the
communicator” but also of the “right to hear or receive information” as a
function of “the interchange of ideas.”187 One could argue that the protection extends to a ‘third-party beneficiary’ that is distinct from the actual
rights holder. Larry Ribstein points out that “[th]e First Amendment does
not guard corporations’ expressive rights, but rather the public’s interest in
hearing what corporations have to say.”188 The debate on corporate protections under the Fourth Amendment on the other hand illustrates that corporate theory can play a crucial role when determining the applicability of certain constitutional rights to corporations. Unlike speech rights, privacy
rights are, by their very nature, intrinsically dependent on the human or
corporate nature of the rights holder.189 The purpose of privacy rights is to
182

Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T, supra note 179.
Id.
184
See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 810 (1978) (emphasizing “the role of
the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.”); see also New York State Bd. of
Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208 (2008).
185
Federal Communications Comm’n (FCC) v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180 (2011).
186
See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (1978) (holding that “[w]hether or not a particular guarantee is
. . . unavailable to corporations . . . depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”)
187
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
188
Larry Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV.
1022, 1022 (2010).
189
See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1177–78 (2011), which holds that “‘personal privacy’
183
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protect the rights holder first and foremost, specifically from arbitrary government intrusion, and secure an inalienable sphere of personal privacy.190
It is thereby a function of personal liberty in the United States.191
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court relied heavily on corporate
theory and related questions about the nature of the corporation in its debate
on corporate protections under the Fourth Amendment. The practice of the
Court has been extremely consistent in this regard over the last century. The
Court’s early analysis in Hale v. Henkel was deeply grounded in corporate
theory and the discussion about corporate personality.192 However, the decision is not cohesive with regard to the specific corporate theory that is applied by the Court; rather, the decision is a reflection of the deep divergence
over legal questions pertaining to corporate personality at the time.193 Thus,
while the Court granted Fourth Amendment protections to corporations on
grounds of the natural entity theory,194 it denied the corporate form Fifth
Amendment protections based on the artificial entity theory.195 Granted, this
“two-faced view of the corporation” has been perceived as mysterious by
the scholarship,196 yet the Court shows a clear adherence to methodology
that is deeply informed by corporate theory in its analysis. The Court continued to decide corporate Fourth Amendment cases on the bases of corporate theory, this time the artificial entity theory. In Morton Salt, when dealing with Fourth Amendment protections against broad government requests
for document production (regarding pricing, among others), the Court
pointed to the “privilege of acting as an artificial person” that corporations
derive from society.197 This reiteration of the artificial entity theory led the
Court to allow such government requests even if they were “caused by
nothing more than official curiosity.”198
The most recent corporate privacy case that the Supreme Court examined, namely FCC v. AT&T, discusses the corporate identity of the rights
claimant in terms of semantics, rather than legal doctrines about corporate

[under the Freedom of Information Act] . . . conveys more than just ‘of a person’; it suggests a type of
privacy evocative of human concerns—not usually associated with an entity like AT&T.”
190
See Anita Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual
Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 629 (1987).
191
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE
L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).
192
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1906).
193
See Mayer, supra note 29, 622; see also Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities:
Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 139 (2013)
194
Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
195
Id. at 75.
196
See Mayer, supra note 29, at 622; see also Reza Dibadj, (Mis)conceptions of the Corporation, 29
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 731, 741 (2013).
197
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
198
Id.
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personality.199 Yet, the corporate nature of the applicant is clearly relevant
for the Court’s analysis in this case, unlike the impression to the contrary in
Citizens United and Bellotti. The case of FCC v. AT&T also illustrates the
important role of corporate theory as it provides a vehicle to account for
competing interests of corporate constituents, including shareholders and
potentially also stakeholders based on the prevailing doctrine of the corporate objective. Unlike other cases before, FCC v. AT&T did not deal with
protections sought against intrusive government inquiries. Rather, FCC v.
AT&T had already disclosed the information to the government and instead
sued to prevent the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from disclosing the information to the public, “including AT&T’s investors, employees, customers, and competitors.”200 It is important to realize that “privacy rights that conceal the inner working of a business from view free the
institution [i.e., the corporation] and its decision makers from responsibility
to its stakeholders,”201 who might have a vested interest in disclosure of the
information. This is particularly true for a company’s shareholders as a corporation’s major constituency (and principal) under modern corporate law.
Granting corporations a right to privacy might help to perpetuate illegal or
anticompetitive business conduct and thus harm the shareholders’ investment as the main constituents of the corporate form. Over the last century,
corporations were granted “privacy rights protection seclusion, confidentiality, and [even] secrecy.”202 Especially the latter cases raise issues of potentially competing shareholder and stakeholder interests that can be effectively addressed by applying corporate theory.
Even though the Court’s methodology in FCC v. AT&T might seem to
be in tension with the approach in Bellotti and Citizens United, FCC v.
AT&T in fact reinforces the test promulgated in Bellotti, as recently endorsed in Citizens United.
Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and
other organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals. . . .
Whether or not a particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends on the nature,
history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.203

FCC v. AT&T focuses its analysis on whether a corporation can be ascribed “personal privacy” rights as an exemption of disclosure under the
199

Federal Communications Comm’n (FCC) v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1177 (2011).
Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T, supra note 179.
201
Id.
202
Allen, supra note 190, at 629.
203
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
200
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Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).204
The rights-specific character of the Supreme Court’s corporate personhood jurisprudence should not be overstated, and more research is required
to examine the historical purpose of free speech and particularly privacy
rights under the Constitution with regard to corporations. However, it is fair
to say that the status of corporations under the Constitution cannot be discussed in a vacuum, but needs to be seen in the context of the respective
rights provisions.
Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United, corporate theory is still relevant when determining corporate rights and regulatory
powers of the state. Corporate theory might not always be a decisive factor
in the analysis of the Court depending on the interpretation of the rights
provision in question, but it did not vanish from the Supreme Court’s methodological approach to corporate personhood in principle, as some commentators have argued.205 It is still an integral part of the methodological
approach by the Court, as the Court has most recently reaffirmed in its decision in Hobby Lobby, where understanding the nature, structure, and constituents of the corporation remains highly relevant to the analysis.206 A
study of the Supreme Court’s case law shows that, contrary to some voices
in the scholarship, the Court has not dismissed corporate theory, 207 but rather subsumes it under larger objectives, such as democracy and the “free
204

FCC v. AT&T deals with a matter of statutory interpretation. Thus, the Court emphasizes that
“this case does not call upon us to pass on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of
constitutional or common law,” but rather it deals with a question of statutory interpretation. Federa
Communications Comm’n (FCC) v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011). Still, FCC v. AT&T provides important lessons for the corporate personhood debate. Even if the privacy term under the FOIA
might not be identical to the privacy concept under the 4th Amendment, it can be assumed that they are
at least congruent. The scholarship has been discussing the case of FCC v. AT&T as a progression of the
Court’s jurisprudence on corporate rights, especially since this has been the first decision after Citizens
United dealing with the issue of corporate rights. See Mark Walsh, Making It Personal: Corporate
Rights are Again at Issue as AT&T Wants to Keep Info a Secret, 97 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (2011).
205
See Mayer, supra note 29, at 620 (arguing that “[a]fter 1960, the Court abandoned theorizing
about corporate personhood.”)
206
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that “the purpose of
extending rights to corporations is to protect the rights of people associated with the corporation.”); see
also Id. at 15 (holding that “modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue
profit at the expense of everything else”)
207
Compare Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of Association to Freedom of The Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 5, 31 (2012) and
Jessica A. Levinson, We the Corporations?: The Constitutionality of Limitations on Corporate Electoral
Speech after Citizens United, 46 U.S.F.L. REV. 307, 307-08, 318 (2011) with Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 516 (2011) (emphasizing the importance of corporate law to inform the Supreme Court’s corporate speech jurisprudence). For a compelling different view on the issue, see Amy J.
Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Queston of Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV.
575, 581 (2012) (focusing on “citizenship” rather than “personhood” to address the issue of corporate
political speech).
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market of ideas,” if so mandated by the underlying purpose of the respective Bill of Rights provision.208
2. Resurrecting Shareholder and Constituency Protection within
Corporate Personhood
Citizens United (and, for that matter, the Bellotti standard) should not
be considered the benchmark from which to draw conclusions on the role
(or demise) of corporate theory in the American corporate personhood debate for reasons set forth below. This is particularly true with regard to
questions about how to treat competing shareholder and constituency (i.e.
stakeholder) interests within the corporate personhood discussion.
(a) The Common Thread of Corporate Theory
It is not that the majority of justices would necessarily dispute the logic of putting corporate back into corporate personhood, but they are simply
reaching decisions in the narrow case before them. On the facts of the case,
Citizens United dealt with a nonprofit corporation. If one takes a conservative reading of the case, one must conclude that Citizens United has more
limited implications for the corporate personhood debate than often argued.209 Acknowledging the significance of the ruling with regard to political speech of non-profit corporations, it is important not to overinflate the
ruling beyond the specific facts of the case. One can fully support of Citizens United and still ask the question how this ruling would impact forprofit corporations if such a case were presented to the nine Justices. It remains open how the Supreme Court would decide a case where a major
publicly held multi-shareholder company, such as Google Inc., for example,
used general treasury funds to support a certain political candidate or simply to contribute to a debate on issues of general interest, such as public
health, for example. The company’s management may find such corporate
activities in line with the company’s motto and corporate culture of “do no
evil,”210 but shareholders might have divergent interests, especially on controversial issues of public policy.211
It is often overlooked that while the Supreme Court in Citizens United
208

See Mayer, supra note 29, at 629, 633.
Allison R. Hayward, Citizens United: Correct, Modest, and Overdue, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. &
POL’Y 1, 2–3 (arguing Citizens United had a narrow impact and left long-settled precedent intact),
http://www.akronconlawjournal.com/articles/citizens-united-correct-modest-and-overdue.pdf.
210
See BENJAMIN EDELMAN & THOMAS EISENMANN, GOOGLE INC. 17, 19 (Harv. Bus. Pub. 2010).
211
It can be argued that no intracorporate conflict exists if management can show that the expenditures made are in the corporation’s economic interest, such as lobbying efforts with regard to favorable
legislation and regulation. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (White,
J., dissenting).
209
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overturned the anti-distortion rationale of Austin (dealing with the corrosive
effects on the external political process), the Court has not yet spoken on
the merits and in sufficient detail to the constitutional rights premises of
multi-shareholder for-profit corporations and intra-corporate conflicts that
might arise in those large corporations. Thus, “despite the dictum in Citizens United—which actually dealt with the clearly protected speech of a
nonprofit corporation similar to MCFL . . . it remains open how the Court
would hold in a case where the speech was exercised by a multi-shareholder
for-profit corporation.”212 Also, in its most recent decision in Hobby Lobby—dealing with the religious exercise of a closely held corporation solely
owned by one single family—the Court again avoided (and incidentally
glossed over) possible intra-corporate conflicts, which in fact existed with
regard to numerous of Hobby Lobby’s employees.213
Even in the cases where the Court has dealt with corporations in a nonprofit form, the Court raises the issue of conflicting shareholder interests,
often in dicta.214 This can be understood as an indication that the Court’s
holding in Citizens United, declaring that the corporate identity of the
speaker is irrelevant in establishing its personhood under the First Amendment,215 does not automatically hold true for the general status of corporations across the entire Bill of Rights and the Constitution. Rather, the
Court’s treatment of intra-corporate conflicts and how they can be remedied
at the internal corporate governance level, at the statutory level, or in the
market place216 signals that the Court did not intend to dismiss corporate
theory from the corporate personhood debate all together. This is reinforced
by the fact that the Court on several occasions throughout the judgment has
referred to different theories about corporate personality, including the real
entity as well as the association theory.217
Burt Neuborne has convincingly argued that, “in settings where intracorporate conflicts of interest are likely to exist, the [U.S. Supreme] Court
212

Neuborne, supra note 15, at 791-92.
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794–95 (2014) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
214
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010); Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675, 676 n.8 (1990) (While the Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce in this case characterizes as a nonprofit corporation, the Court still addresses the issue of
“protection of dissenting shareholders” in “ordinary [i.e. forprofit] business corporations.” The Court
reaffirms that “[w]e have long recognized the importance of state corporate law in ‘protect[ing] the
shareholders’ of corporations chartered within the State.” (internal citation omitted)); Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986)) (emphasizing that MCFL “has
no shareholders,” what “ensures that persons connected with the organization will have no economic
disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity”).
215
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350, 376.
216
Id. 37-71; id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354, 356 (2010) (majority opinion) (characterizing the corporation as an “associations of citizens”); id. at 354–55 (referring to the speech and “voice” of the corporation as a real entity that deserves protection).
213
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requires each human rights-holder to assert his or her own constitutional
rights without recourse to a centralized enforcer [i.e., the corporation].”218
This attention to intra-corporate conflicts as part of the Court’s legal analysis is an important function of corporate theory in the Court’s thinking on
corporate personhood. In that vein, the Supreme Court has assessed privacy-based claims based on the interests of shareholders and has denied corporate privacy rights if the disclosure of corporate information would advance the interests of the members of the corporate community, while
exemptions from reporting would merely benefit a few corporate insiders.219 Also, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate speech protection under the First Amendment has not been entirely blind to the corporate
organizational structure even though the Court has held in Bellotti that the
corporate identity of the speaker was not relevant. Thus, Justice Lewis F.
Powell’s majority opinion in Bellotti addressed the question whether the interests of “shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by management on behalf of the corporation” ought to be protected in the face of
corporate political spending by management.220
The Court had the opportunity to speak to the shareholder protection
rationale in cases involving for-profit multi-shareholder corporations on
several occasions in the 1970s, but it never decided the issue.221 For example, in Bellotti (involving a bank’s use of general treasury funds to oppose a
referendum proposal on raising state personal income tax) the majority
opinion touched upon the issue of protection of shareholder rights as a
compelling state interest to justify a statutory speech restriction.222 But in
the end the Court left the issue unresolved.223 The decision holds that the
statute was both underinclusive and overinclusive in protecting shareholder
rights “under the circumstances of this case,”224 thus “leaving open the
[question of the] constitutionality of an appropriately drawn shareholder
protection statute.”225
The Court reasoned as follows: “The statute is said to serve this interest by preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views
with which some shareholders may disagree. This purpose is belied, however, by the provisions of the statute, which are both underinclusive and
218

Neuborne, supra note 15, at 788.
See California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55, 81 (1974); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75 (1970).
220
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978).
221
See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788; G.M. Leasing Corp. v. U.S., 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977); California
Bankers Ass’n, 416 U.S. at 55, 81; Colonnade Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 75.
222
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794–95.
223
In the context of the specific facts of this case, this might not be surprising considering that “given the subject matter of the referendum . . . , it was highly unlikely that intracorporate conflicts of interest over the speech existed” on part of the shareholders.” Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792.
224
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795; see also id. at 793–94.
225
Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792.
219
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overinclusive.”226 The Court decided the issue on the same grounds in Citizens United,227 thus perpetuating its “decision-avoidance route”228 on the
question.
The Roberts Court further expressed in dicta, again in reference to Bellotti, that “there is little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by
shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”229 In the
eyes of the Court, “[t]hose reasons are sufficient to reject this shareholder
protection interest.”230
The enormous trust that the Court vests in such “procedures” while
abdicating judicial oversight of fundamental shareholder interests in the
performance of corporate actions that are blatantly political in character
leaves much to be considered. The constitutionality of the shareholder protection rationale requires a more sophisticated examination than the cursory
treatment that Citizens United and Bellotti offers on the issue. These are
concerns that were raised first by Justice Byron White in his dissent in Bellotti231 and then by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Citizens United.232 Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Hobby Lobby adds another dimension to the
protection rationale underpinning the corporate personhood debate, namely
the impact on other constituencies, in other words, stakeholders, of the corporation.233 The legal academy should ponder these considerations afresh.
We take up the issue below.
Several commentators have described the Supreme Court’s analysis as
too “unsophisticated”234 since it shows the “tendency to anthropomorphize
the corporation as a freestanding, sentient being”235 and lacks a thorough
discussion of “the corporation, as a collective entity.”236 Greenwood emphasizes the crucial role of corporate theory in the corporate personhood
debate by explaining that “[i]f corporate speech is to be corporate at all,
there must be a clear explanation of how the group decision legitimately can
be made.”237
(b) The Shortfalls of the “Corporate Democracy” Argument
It is questionable whether regular procedures of “corporate democra226

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793–94.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
228
Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792.
229
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (internal citation omitted).
230
Id.
231
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 802–22 (White, J., dissenting).
232
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475–79 (2010) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
233
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2787(2014)).
234
Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1013; see also Ciepley, supra note 14, at 223.
235
Neuborne, supra note 15, at 772.
236
Greenwood, supra note 11, 1011.
237
Id. at 1024.
227
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cy” sufficiently protect the rights of shareholders as the majority in Bellotti
suggested238 and the majority in Citizens United confirmed (in dicta).239 In
his dissent, Justice Stevens voiced concerns of “coerced speech” on part of
shareholders “who disagree with the corporation’s electoral message” when
management uses general treasury funds for electioneering expenditures.240
Unlike the majority opinion (in dicta), Justice Stevens defies the notion that
“abuse [of shareholder money] [can be] corrected by shareholders ‘through
the procedures of corporate democracy.’”241 Justice Stevens introduces important aspects pertaining to corporate theory and the characteristics of the
corporation into the discussion that the majority opinion merely scratched at
the surface and left unresolved in the end.
The majority Court in Citizens United followed the approach of the
Bellotti Court with regard to the shareholder protection rationale. Based on
Bellotti, procedures of “corporate democracy” as a vehicle for shareholder
protection are to be understood to include “intracorporate remedies,” and
“judicial remed[ies].”242 The Bellotti Court stated:
Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist
upon protective provisions in the corporation’s charter, shareholders
normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests. In
addition to intra-corporate remedies, minority shareholders generally
have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge
corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for improper
corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of
management.243

Like Justice White more than 20 years earlier,244 Justice Stevens raises
concerns to dismiss the shareholder protection rationale without further
analysis.245 Justice Stevens warns about relying upon intra-corporate governance systems and statutory actions since corporate law scholarship has
found that “[i]n practice . . . many corporate lawyers will tell you that ‘these
rights are so limited as to be almost nonexistent,’ given the internal authority wielded by boards and managers and the expansive protections afforded
by the business judgment rule.”246 Especially, since general chartering has
become the prevailing practice, shareholders’ leverage over management

238

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
240
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241
Id. at 476–77 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
242
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794–95 (1978).
243
Id.
244
Id. at 804–06 (White, J., dissenting).
245
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246
Id. at 477.
239
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has decreased even more.247
Also, the reasoning that dissenting shareholders are “free to withdraw
[their] investment at any time and for any reason,”248 falls short of a sophisticated in-depth analysis in light of corporate theory. Justice White, in his
dissent in Bellotti, has undertaken a more thorough analysis of corporate
theory to inform the discussion about the shareholder protection rationale.
Thus, he accurately points out that usually corporations are “operated for
the purpose of making profits.”249 Under modern-day corporate law, this
common purpose unites the shareholders. Justice White emphasizes that
“[t]his unanimity of purpose breaks down, however, when corporations
make expenditures or undertake activities designed to influence the opinion
or votes of the general public on political and social issues that have no material connection with or effect upon their business, property, or assets.”250
When this “unanimity in purpose breaks down,”251 as Justice White put it,
the corporate law premise that shareholders share a common purpose, i.e.,
to increase the value of their investment, does not hold anymore and shareholders morph again into the diverse groups of interests, beliefs, and values
they are in reality, even if not under the corporate law fiction.252 This results
in intra-corporate conflict when the corporation (through its management)
engages in political speech.253
Intra-corporate conflict can take different forms, however, depending
on the right in question. Cases pertaining to corporate privacy claims vividly illustrate this point. In those cases, the asserted right to privacy against
disclosure requirements of financial and other business information can
conflict with “the interests of members of the corporation community,”254
primarily shareholders, this would “shield . . . the enterprise from being
used for unlawful purposes”255 or “prevent . . . organized crime from gaining foothold in the industry”256 and thus protect shareholders’ investment.
It is certainly true that shareholders invest in a company voluntarily
and can withdraw their investment at any time by simply selling their stock.
Unlike in partnerships, exit is easily possible in corporations due to the liq247

See Morton Horwitz, supra note 50, at 181; see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic
Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489 (1989).
248
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978) (majority opinion).
249
Id. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
250
Id. at 805–06 (White, J., dissenting).
251
Id.
252
See Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1037.
253
Note that not all cases, where a corporation claims First Amendment rights, necessarily produce
an intra-corporate conflict. Thus, as Burt Neuborne accurately observes, in “commercial speech, free
press, and nonprofit corporation cases, . . . an intracorporate commonality of interest in asserting free
speech protection undoubtedly exist[s].” Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792.
254
Id. at 789 (citing California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)).
255
Id.
256
Id. (citing Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75 (1970)).
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uidation protection and the feature of perpetual life that is inherent in the
corporate form.257 Usually, if an organization does not reflect the goals of
(some of) its shareholders, those dissenting shareholders may leave the organization. It is fair to assume that this “‘exit’ mechanism . . . will keep the
leadership relatively representative.”258 Corporations, however, “may have
more features of exit failures [for non-financial reasons] than many other
organizations, due to the importance of the profit motive as the primary reason investors participate.”259 Moreover, since the corporate form has become the most important investment vehicle of modern times operating on a
strict profit-maximizing premise,260 it is difficult to argue that shareholders
should foreclose an economic opportunity (which is the very reason why
they invested in the first place) if they disagree with the politics of the corporation.261 The inherent risk is that “people who have invested in the business corporation for purely economic reasons” might be taken advantage of
if they are not willing to “sacrific[e] their economic objectives.”262
Granted, a dissenting shareholder is not compelled to continue being a
member of a corporation, but it compels him to choose his political beliefs
over his economic goals. Pointing to the “exit solution” does not, however,
solve the shareholder protection issue pertaining to the corporate personhood discussion. This is particularly true, since, as Justice Stevens highlighted, “[m]ost American households that own stock do so through intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension plans, [citation omitted] which
makes it more difficult both to monitor and to alter particular holdings.”263
The absurdity of the exit solution as a viable vehicle for shareholder protection would be even more amplified in corporate privacy cases, since granting corporations and their management a right to confidentiality and even
secrecy defies the transparency that is needed for shareholders to decide
whether or not to exit. While Justices Stevens and White have introduced a
perspective that is informed by corporate theory and accounts for some of
the complexities of the corporate form, the Court has yet to speak on the
constitutionality of the shareholder protection rationale. The issue needs a
more thorough and sophisticated treatment by the Court than the brief dicta
in Citizens United and the holding in Bellotti offer so far. Also, a more indepth corporate theory analysis of the doctrine of corporate personhood is
necessary in the legal scholarship. This is particularly true since the Court
257

See, e.g., Ciepley, supra note 14, at 226; see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. FREER &
MICHAEL J. ROBERTS, BUSINESS STRUCTURES 138–39 (2002)
258
Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1026.
259
Id. at 1032.
260
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 565.
261
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 477–78 (2010) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
262
Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L. REV. 133, 201 (1998).
263
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 477 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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in Hobby Lobby has again deferred disputes among owners to remedies under state corporate law.264 The insufficient nature of such remedies appears
particularly stark in closed corporations where deadlock situations to the
detriment of minority owners are common due to the lack of a readily available market for shares in closed corporations.265 State courts have increasingly extended fiduciary duties to be owed by majority shareholders to minority ones in closed corporations for that reason.266 The Supreme Court’s
reliance on the constitutional structure of the corporation and rule by majority under that structure in Hobby Lobby,267 is at odds with this sellestablished corporate law doctrine.
While this article aims to illustrate this need for a corporate-theory informed approach to corporate personhood and highlights the normative implications that such an approach would have, it recognizes that much more
isis to be said on the various corporate theory aspects pertaining to the doctrine of corporate personality, including on the shareholder protection rationale. However, this is beyond the scope of this article and remains open
for future treatment in the scholarship.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s analysis on the corporate
theory prerogatives of corporate personhood falls short at times, corporate
theory is still deeply engrained in the methodological DNA of the Court as
the relevant case law over the last century has shown. The ECHR on the
other hand, has ignored corporate theory altogether in its jurisprudence
dealing with corporate “human rights” under the Convention. The normative implication of this approach is that intra-corporate conflicts are not accounted for in the Court’s analysis on corporate personhood and the scope
of corporate fundamental rights, such as speech, privacy, and due process.
This is particularly problematic in a European context, where derivative actions for shareholders to address grievances are not clearly articulated in legal practice.268
C. Europe’s Missing “Corporate” Person
While the European Court of Human Rights, like the Supreme Court,
has broadly extended the rights provisions under its jurisdiction to companies, with the exception of several rights that are considered applicable only
to natural persons,269 there is one key difference that can be observed,
namely the role of corporate theory or the lack thereof in the jurisprudence
264

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2756 (2014).
See generally David G. Epstein et. al, BUSINESS STRUCTURES (2002).
266
Id.
267
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 2768.
268
See Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J.
Econ. Perspectives 117, 133–34 (2007).
269
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 110.
265
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of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of
Justice (ECJ). Even though the ECHR “settled on a surprisingly favourable
view of the applicability of the rights and entitlements to corporate claimants,”270 the analysis of the Court often falls short and is primarily grounded
in a pragmatist view with strong teleological considerations, while the corporate identity of the rights applicant is simply ignored. As in the United
States, the right to speech (Article 10 of the Convention) and the right to
privacy (Article 8 of the Convention) have been most heavily debated before the ECHR. It is in this context that the corporate identity of the applicant creates the most traction with regard to the rights protection in question.
In the discussion below, this article examines the absence of corporate
theory in European judicial views about corporate speech and privacy rights
under the Convention. Nor is there hardly any recognition of the competing
interests of shareholder and other stakeholder of the firm in how the European Courts determine the scope of corporate under the Convention.
1. The Lack of Corporate Theory
It was not until 1980 that the ECHR first decided a case involving corporate speech. In Sunday Times v. UK, the ECHR granted speech protections to a newspaper company “without any discussion as to the relevance
of its corporate nature of the underlying for-profit motivations.”271 The
ECHR was confronted with similar cases in the following years in Markt
Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany and Groppera Radio AG, where the
ECHR again held that corporate applicants fell under the scope of Article
10 of the Convention.272 However, in neither of those cases was the corporate element explicitly discussed by the ECHR. It was only in its decision in
Autronic AG v. Switzerland that the ECHR conducted a more thorough
analysis of the status of corporate speech under the Convention.273 For that
reason, Autronic can be considered the ECHR’s watershed decision on corporate speech.274
In a series of case law, the ECHR arrived at a line of jurisprudence that
considered the profit-making motive as irrelevant.275 The status as a “profitmaking corporate bod[y]” was therefore not the controversial element in
270

Id. at 111.
Sunday Times v. UK, 38 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at ¶ 59(b) (1981)
272
Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 25
(1989); Groppera Radio and Others v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at ¶ 49 (1990).
273
Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 47(1), (2) (1990).
274
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 129.
275
See Casado Coca v. Spain, 285 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) ¶ 35 (1994); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH
and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 26 (1989); see also EMBERLAND, supra
note 10, at 140.
271

635

3KAEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/15 12:18 PM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

35:591 (2015)

Autronic.276 The ECHR kept its analysis brief and held that “neither Autronic AG’s legal status as a limited company nor the fact that its activities were
commercial nor the intrinsic nature of the freedom of expression can deprive Autronic AG of the protection of Art. 10.”277 However, the respondent
government, Switzerland, argued that Article 10 of the Convention does not
apply due to the purely transactional character of the speech that did not
“attach . . . any importance to the content of the transmission . . . , since it
was pursuing purely economic and technical interests.”278 Switzerland
raised the concern that this would lead to the protection of mere business
activity stating that “freedom of expression that was exercised . . . exclusively for pecuniary gain came under the head of economic freedom.”279 In
Autronic, the ECHR eventually granted protection of freedom of expression
that merely sought to demonstrate the functioning of a satellite dish to promote sales; the content of the speech was entirely irrelevant and no interests
of a target audience were protected.280 In comparison, the U.S. Supreme
Court strictly applies the “free marketplace of ideas”281 concept to commercial speech, with the consequence that both the speech and the content of
the speech are highly relevant. In that regard, the ECHR grants broader protection of corporate speech than the Supreme Court, which can be widely
regarded as the leading protagonist promoting the commercial speech doctrine.282
The ECHR’s decision in Autronic is emblematic of an approach that
focuses on the underlying values that the corporate claim might protect,
such as speech as a function of democracy,283 rather than with an ontological analysis of whether the respective right can (by their nature and historical conception under the Convention) be extended to corporations, despite
no explicit textual interpretative support.284 Thus, the ECHR has based its
decision in Autronic on the importance of protecting the content of speech
and the substance of ideas as a function of the right of the listeners, who
have “the right to receive and impart information,” even if the latter is
276

See Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 47(1) (1990).
Id.
278
Id. at ¶44.
279
Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44(2) (1990).
280
Id.
281
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 330 (2010); New York State Bd. of
Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008); Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
282
See Eric Barendt, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 54 (1985).
283
Handyside v. UK, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 49(2) (1979); see also Hertel v. Switzerland, 59
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 46 (1999).
284
The ECHR has at times made a textual argument to support the application of the Convention to
corporations, stating that, according to the text of the Convention, the provisions apply “to ‘everyone,’
whether natural or legal persons.” See, e.g., Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶
47(1) (1990).
277
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commercial in nature.285 The ECHR’s approach is reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s alleged shift from “ontology to teleology” in its corporate
constitutional rights jurisprudence, as discussed above.286
The interpretative approach of the ECHR is informed by the notion
that the Convention is “an Instrument designed to maintain and promote the
ideals and values of democratic society.”287 This results in an “objective”
approach to human rights protection that focuses on how the applicant’s
claim is conducive to promoting general values underlying the Convention,
such as equal treatment, rule of law and democracy, rather than on the subjective rights position of the applicant.288 With this approach, the ECHR
was able to avoid difficult questions of corporate theory and, even more
importantly, questions pertaining to the role of corporations in society.
In its case law, the ECHR acknowledges that corporations can be involved in pure commercial speech (characterized by the intent to “incit[e]
the public to purchase a particular product”)289 as well as political (in terms
of non-commercial) speech.290 Political speech is present when the statements “participate in a debate affecting the general interest”291 or concern
“controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in general.”292 It is irrelevant, according to the ECHR, if the statements are commercially motivated.293 Thus, some forms of corporate speech benefit from the stringent
protections awarded to political speech that significantly reduces the “margin of appreciation” afforded to national authorities of the member states.294
Emberland has described this approach by the ECHR precisely, stating that
“[p]olitical elements in the speech tend . . . to consume whatever commer-

285

Id. at ¶ 47.
John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study, 88 HAR. L. REV. 1482, 1496 (1975); see also
EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 136, 146.
287
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 53(3) (1979).
288
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 139–46.
289
VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H. R. 4 at ¶57 (2001).
290
Compare VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H. R. 4 at ¶57 (2001) (regarding commercial speech), Mouvement Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland, 16354/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012)
(commercial speech), and Sigma Radio Television Ltd. V. Cyprus, 32181/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011)
(commercial speech) with Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (regarding political speech), Sunday Times v. UK, 38 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at ¶
59(b) (1981) (political speech), Groppera Radio and Others v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A)
(1990) (political speech), TV Test AS v. Norway, 21132/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (political speech), and
Standard Verlagsgesellschaft MBH v. Austria, 37464/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) (political speech).
291
Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 1 (1999).
292
VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H. R. 4 at ¶70 (2001).
293
See Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 47 (1998).
294
Id. (holding that “[a] margin of appreciation is particularly essential in commercial matters . . .
[i]t is however necessary to reduce the extent margin of the appreciation when what is at stake is not a
given individual’s purely ‘commercial’ statements, but his participation in a debate affecting the general
interest, for example over public health”)
286
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cial motivation may have prompted the statement at the outset.”295
The extension by the ECHR to include corporate speech under the protections of the Convention has been opposed by national courts and governments of member states, especially in cases of commercial speech without a clear political nexus.296 In the face of such resistance and the
increasing criticism of judicial activism,297 it seems surprising that the
ECHR has not based its analysis on a general discussion of the nature of
business organizations and the normative implications of bringing the latter
under the ambit of the Convention.
The ECHR has extended Article 10 protections, without any detailed
analysis, in cases of corporate speech that contributes to a debate of public
interest. In cases of speech that are purely commercial, however, the ECHR
explicitly examines the corporate identity of the speaker and whether it fits
under the ambit of Article 10 of the Convention.298 Yet, even in those cases,
the ECHR does not draw upon corporate theory and the question of the nature of the corporation or other forms of business organizations concerned,
such as LLCs, partnerships, etc. As reflected in American scholarship on
corporate personhood under the U.S. Constitution, corporate theory is
deemed decisive, particularly in cases pertaining to corporate political
speech and especially if the case concerns a for-profit (multi-shareholder)
corporation.299 If a company/management engages in political speech, the
diversity in shareholder values and beliefs becomes apparent and can lead
to intra-corporate conflicts of interest that cannot be ignored in the corporate personhood debate.300 In contrast, cases concerning purely commercial
speech, such as advertisements, show a commonality in interest that is
prevalent among shareholders and other members of the corporate community301 since there may be a “material connection with or effect upon their
business.”302 Corporate theory would help identify, account for, and avoid
intra-corporate conflict with competing interests of corporate constituents,
i.e., primarily shareholders but possibly also other stakeholders.
295

EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 119.
Swiss government in Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44(2) (1990);
German government in: Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 161 ¶ 25 (1989) (holding that the speech in question is “not intended to influence or mobilise
public opinion, but to promote the economic interests of a given group of undertakings” and therefore
“fell within the scope of the freedom to conduct business . . . , which is not protected by the Convention.”); See also Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2000,
BVerfGE 102, 347 (2000), 102 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 591, 2001 (Ger.).
297
See Jean-Paul Costa, On the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments, 7
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 173, 174 (2011).
298
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 119, 129.
299
See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792.
300
See Daniel Greenwood, supra note 13, at 1093.
301
Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792.
302
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
296
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Thus, the question arises why the ECHR has not considered corporate
theory to inform its analysis about the applicability of the Convention to
corporations. First, unlike in the United States, political speech cases in the
commercial area are usually not concerned primarily with the legitimacy of
corporate electioneering, since campaign financing by corporations plays
only a limited role under the law and practice in Europe. Rather, the landmark cases before the ECHR on the issue of political speech in a commercial context have dealt with cases involving speech by business organizations or professionals in a commercial context (often with a competitionrelated significance) that contributes to a general public debate.303 This form
of corporate speech is less directly related to the political processes, which
might explain why the ECHR has not felt the need to discuss the problems
pertaining to the commercial nature of the speech to the same extent that the
U.S. Supreme Court has done. This does not mean, however, that corporate
theory would not be relevant in the analysis of the ECHR, as has been argued before. It simply might provide an explanation why the ECHR has not
focused much of its intellectual effort on questions pertaining to the corporate nature of the rights applicant.
Second, the ECHR has not had to decide yet a political speech case involving a publicly held business corporation with multiple shareholders.
Markt intern involved a publishing firm that “seeks to defend the interests
of small and medium-sized retail businesses against the competition of
large-scale distribution companies.”304 Like in the United States, the media
sector enjoys special protection under the European regime considering its
critical function as a “public watchdog” in a democratic society.305 The other case before the ECHR that involved commercial speech contributing to a
general public debate is Hertel. This case did not concern statements by a
general for-profit corporation either. Rather, the case dealt with statements
made by an individual researcher in the economic sphere and with a likely
effect on fair competition.306
It is, however, to be expected that the ECHR will be confronted with
cases of corporate speech involving a for-profit multi-shareholder corporation, especially in a competition-related context, in the near future. This is
particularly true ever since the Lisbon Treaty integrated the European human rights regime even deeper into the EU legal system.307 Now that the
European Convention on Human Rights is binding on EU institutions, com303

See Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 25
(1989); see also Groppera Radio and Others v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1990).
304
Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 9
(1989).
305
Observer and Guardian v. UK, 216 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at ¶ 59 (b) (1992).
306
Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 32 (1999).
307
See generally Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty
of Lisbon, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 654 (2011).
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panies can rely directly on the protections under the Convention as a defense against antitrust investigations by the European Commission as the
main enforcer of EU antitrust laws.
Major publicly traded companies invoked rights under the Convention
in an EU antitrust context even before the Lisbon Treaty, and it is likely that
we will see more rather than less cases like this in the future. Thus, the
software giant Intel has raised due process concerns (based on Article 6(1)
of the Convention) in EU antitrust proceedings challenging the broad investigatory powers of the EU Commission.308
Against this backdrop, the precedent of Hertel could easily translate
into a case involving a large business corporation making statements on
general issues of public debate as part of their marketing strategy with a
possible effect on competition. A case before the German Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) involving Benetton, the major Italian
fashion company, dealt with exactly that situation, namely a sharp focus on
corporate political speech. The case concerned Benetton’s controversial
“shock” advertising campaign. The German Constitutional Court found the
unfair competition ban on the advertisement to be unconstitutional since it
was violating the company’s freedom of expression. The Constitutional
Court held that the use of “strong imagery to create associations with controversial issues for the purpose of marketing the firm’s goods, even if the
imagery/issue lacked a connection to the firm’s goods or services.”309 Under
this judgment, corporations could use marketing tools to engage in public
debates and raise awareness of general issues.
2. The Missing Protection Rationale
Aside from the ECHR’s corporate speech jurisprudence, the lack of
corporate theory in the Court’s corporate personhood debate becomes
abundantly clear in its case law dealing with the prerogatives of corporate
privacy protection under Article 8 of the Convention.
The ECHR’s decision in Colas Est SA v. France310 constitutes a landmark case in the ECHR’s jurisprudence pertaining to Article 8 protections
in a corporate context. Unlike in its previous case law, the ECHR made the
leap in Colas to endorse the concept of corporate personality, independent
of any nexus of the business activity to a natural person.311 Based on the
facts of the case, Colas Est SA, a French (for-profit) corporation, was sub308

See,
Editorial,
Intel’s
Human
Rights,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
17,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/17/opinion/17mon2.html.
309
Peer Zumbansen, Federal Constitutional Court Rejects Ban on Benetton Shock Ads: Free Expression, Fair Competition and the Opaque Boundaries Between Political Message and Social Moral
Standards, GERMAN L. J. (citing BVerfGE 102, 347 (2000)).
310
Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2002).
311
See id. at ¶ 40; see also EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 144.
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ject to unwarranted searches and seizures on their corporate premises. The
raids were conducted by the French competition authorities with the goal to
secure evidence of anti-competitive practices.312 The ECHR had to decide
whether corporate premises fall under the ambit of the “home” protection of
Article 8 of the Convention.313 Yet again, the ECHR’s analysis falls short of
a sophisticated examination of the corporate identity of the rights applicant
and the normative implications for the human members of the corporation,
primarily its shareholders.314
Referring to the principle of dynamic interpretation, the ECHR simply
held that “the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted
in the light of present-day conditions . . . . Building on its dynamic interpretation of the Convention, the Court considers that the time has come to hold
that in certain circumstances the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention may be construed as including the right to respect for a company’s
registered office, branches or other business premises.”315 While the ECHR
relied on its previous precedents granting a corporate “home” protection
under Article 8 of the Convention,316 the respondent government as well as
commentators have emphasized the important differences on the facts that
set the case of Colas apart, thus making the ECHR’s analogous approach
seem an imperfect fit.317 The respondent government, here France, emphasized that that “although the Court had made clear [in its previous case law]
that professional or business addresses were protected by Article 8, all the
cases in which it had made that finding had concerned premises where a
natural person had carried on an occupation.”318 The case of Colas, however, lacked this individual nexus as the case concerned the “business premises of public limited companies.”319 One could argue that the Colas court
over-inflated the holding from its previous case law on the topic.
Also, the other precedent that the ECHR relies upon, namely Chappell
v. UK,320 seems to be comparable to the situation presented in Colas, but in
fact differs in one crucial respect. Like in the Colas case, Chappell involved
searches and seizures on company premises. In the latter case, however, the
company offices also served as the home of its only shareholder.321 This
made the corporate premises closely intertwined with the personal sphere of
312

Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 9–11 (2002).
Id. at ¶ 28.
314
See id. at 41 (focusing on the “dynamic interpretation of the Convention” as a “living instrument”
rather than the underyling question pertaining to the nature of the corporations and related theories of the
firm).
315
Id.
316
See id. at ¶ 40.
317
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 14.
318
Id. at ¶ 30.
319
Id.
320
Chappell v. UK, 152 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1989).
321
Id. at ¶ 26(b).
313
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the owner of the corporation, Mr. Chappell. Thus, before Colas, all corporate Article 8 cases involved an “individual link” such that the corporate
premises in question were located in the private “home” (and thus fall in the
personal sphere) of a professional322 or the only shareholder.323
It is fair to say that the ECHR took its holding in Niemietz324 and
Chappell one step further with its decision in Colas. Like in all its previous
jurisprudence dealing with corporate personhood issues, the ECHR did not
discuss the nature of the corporation and the implications for protection under the Convention.325 But for the first time the ECHR endorsed, if only implicitly in Colas, the notion of the corporation as a real entity that is not reducible to its members. Emberland accurately describes this judicial
development as follows: “The Niemietz Court was concerned with the risk
of arbitrary under-inclusion of interests that pertain to the individual person.
This approach is not necessarily transportable to the corporate context
where an individual nexus is at best remotely present.”326
These examples vividly illustrate that corporate theory is severely under-accounted for in the jurisprudence of the ECHR, while it is indispensable for answering questions of corporate personhood under the Convention.
Especially, since the European Commission of Human Rights327 found in
Church of Scientology of Paris v. France that “Article 8 of the Convention
has more an individual than a collective character,”328 the ECHR should
recognize corporate personality as a “pragmatic metaphor for a complex set
of . . . human . . . relationships” and thus ensure that its judicial decisions on
corporate personhood “reflect a proper calibration of those human activities
and relationship, both within the corporation[s] and between participants in
the corporate enterprise and the outside world.”329 This approach would be
entirely consistent with the ECHR’s interpretative methodology that is
premised on pragmatic effectiveness according to which the “[c]onvention
is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights
322

Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 97 ¶ 27 (1993).
Chappell v. UK, 152 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1989).
324
Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
325
See Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 40–42 (2002).
326
EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 140.
327
Until 1998, the European Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) assisted the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR); the Commission’s role was to decide on the admissibility of petitions
to the ECHR. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ETS No. 155, entry into force November 1, 1998) eliminated the Commission ceased to exist
and subsumed its functions into the larger and permanent ECHR.
328
Church of Scientology of Paris v. France, App. No. 19509/92, (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 9,
1995) (HUDOC: European Court of Human Rights, Case-Law, Decisions), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (Until 1998, individual complaints under the European Convention on Human
Rights had to be filed with the European Commission of Human Rights, which then decided on its admissibility before bringing the case before the ECHR.).
329
Neuborne, supra note 15, at 774.
323
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that are practical and effective.”330 It would require an explicit discussion
by the ECHR on the question about the nature of the corporation, involving
the complex intra-corporate relationships tracing back to the separation of
ownership and control in the corporate form. This would have important
normative implications as intra-corporate conflict would be addressed.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. Doctrinal Shift in Europe
Important doctrinal lessons on the role of corporate theory in the European debate on corporate personhood can be learned from American jurisprudence and scholarship.331 It becomes patent that while in Europe the
“corporate” in corporate personhood is ignored, in the United States it is
sidestepped in recent U.S. Supreme Court cases. Still, the American approach is much more nuanced than the European one and thus provides an
important benchmark to inform the corporate personhood jurisprudence by
the European Courts.
European corporate personhood doctrine requires a significant doctrinal shift that would make corporate theory about the nature of the corporation and the theories of the firm part of the legal debate. Corporate theory
would help balance clashing interests of a company’s shareholders and mitigate intra-corporate conflicts as a result of corporate personhood.
U.S. doctrine on the other hand, merely would require some more consistency and a sharper re-focus on the corporate theory underpinnings of the
corporate personhood doctrine. In particular, the implications for the United
States are: (1) to realize that corporate theory has not been abandoned in
general from the legal analysis by the Courts; (2) to recognize normatively
that corporate theory needs to be explicitly revitalized as an integral part of
corporate personhood doctrine. Specifically, a more robust analysis of questions pertaining to shareholder and constituency protection in large business
corporations by the courts’ majority (not merely in dissent, concurrences, or
dicta) is required to further mitigate intra-corporate conflicts effectively. A
look to Europe illustrates the unfavorable consequences when this is ignored.
Part 1 below examines how U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence can
help guide European Courts in unraveling intra-corporate relationships and
then highlights some relevant European cases that merit a comparative
analysis. The interests of shareholders and other stakeholders in the corporation are of primary concern here, as are shortcomings in the European ap330

Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H..R. (ser. A) at ¶ 24(2) (1980); see also Comingersoll SA v. Portugal, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 772 at ¶¶ 32(2)), 28(2) (2001).
331
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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proach to corporate personhood. In Part 2, the tendency by the European
Courts to reduce the regulatory power of the member states over corporations is contrasted with the regulatory frameworks erected under American
law and confirmed by the Supreme Court. Understanding the true content of
corporate personhood may explain such variance.
1. Shareholder and Constituency Protection
On several occasions, the ECHR has dealt with rights cases under the
Convention involving publicly held corporations which are particularly
prone to intra-corporate conflicts due to the diversity of interests of its
broad shareholder base that can be in tension with the interests of management. Corporate theory can be considered highly relevant in corporate
rights cases involving multi-shareholder corporations as it can help uncover
and thus avoid intra-corporate conflicts produced by the Court’s corporate
personhood jurisprudence.332 Corporate theory would therefore provide important guidance to the Court’s corporate speech analysis in cases similar to
Autronic that was dealing with a German AG (“Aktiengesellschaft,” i.e.,
publicly held corporation under German law) and its speech protections. It
is to be noted that in the specific case of Autronic the Court was concerned
with strict transactional commercial speech rather than with a corporation’s
participation in a general public discourse or political speech. This makes
intra-corporate conflicts between shareholders and management less likely
since the nature of the speech is merely transactional in terms of promoting
the company’s products and services.333 However, it is just a matter of time
until the European Courts will find before them a case involving corporate
speech claims by a multi-shareholder corporation to protect the content of
its speech (through its management) and thus its right to contribute to a
general public debate issues important to the corporation’s customer base,
its management, or its controlling shareholders.
A look to the U.S. Supreme Court can guide the European way. The
Supreme Court has yet again been wrestling with the question of the nature
of the corporation, the relationship between managerial decision-making
and the (non-commercial) interests of its shareholders and other stakeholders (here employees) and the normative implications for the understanding
and scope of corporate constitutional rights in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby
Stores.334 By taking on the case, the Court signaled that the issue of diversi332

See, e.g., Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131; Autronic AG v. Switzerland,
178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
333
Especially in the specific case at hand, intra-corporate conflicts are not indicated since the speech
that was sought to be protected here concerned merely the transmission of a satellite program for the
purpose of demonstrating the functioning of hardware not however the content of the speech.
334
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.
678 (2013).
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ty of (non-commercial) shareholder and stakeholder interests and resulting
intra-corporate conflicts in its corporate personhood jurisprudence is far
from resolved, contrary to the common belief post-Citizens United.335 It is
important to recognize that by holding that “the purpose of th[e] [corporate]
fiction is to provide protection for human beings,”336 the Court dealt with a
situation of reverse piercing of the corporate veil,337 while in its previous
case law the Court assessed shareholder interests as compelling interests
that might limit the regulatory reach of the government. Yet, the common
thread of possible intra-corporate conflicts remains the same in all relevant
cases—in Hobby Lobby with competing employee interests while in Bellotti
and Citizens United with competing shareholder interests.
Unlike their American counterpart, the European courts are not even
engaging in the debate on how our understanding of the nature of the corporation (with an eye to its respective constituents) informs questions about
corporate rights under the Convention as a function of the doctrine of corporate personhood. It is imperative that the ECHR and the ECJ realize that
corporate theory is not merely a theoretical wrinkle to the corporate personhood analysis, but it has far-reaching functional implications for the role of
corporations as participants in modern society, as the case of Hobby Lobby
vividly illustrates where “a for-profit corporation [denies] its employees the
health coverage of contraceptives . . . , based on the religious objections of
the corporation’s owners.”338
The case of Colas out of the ECHR further illustrates vividly how corporate theory would contribute to a much more nuanced corporate personhood doctrine in the European Courts. Deciding whether unwarranted
searches and seizures on their corporate premises were permissible or
whether they would constitute a violation of the protections under Article 8
of the Convention, the ECHR lacked any discussion of the interest of Colas
Est SA’s (“Société Anonyme,” equivalent to a public limited company under common law) shareholders.339 By ignoring corporate theory the Court
runs the risk of reaching results that might be counter to the interests of the
corporate applicant’s constituents, primarily its shareholders but also its
other stakeholders. It is imperative for European Courts to include a discussion of the nature of the corporation (and underlying legal theories of the
firm) in their analysis as corporate theory would help identify and mitigate
intra-corporate conflicts. Thus, in the case of Colas, the interest of the corporation to protect its internal information from disclosure can be consid335

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
337
Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L.
33, 34 (1990).
338
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (No. 13354).
339
Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 40–42.
336
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ered in conflict with the competing interests of its shareholders in transparency in order to shield the (corporate) entity from liabilities arising from
unlawful and/or anti-competitive behavior. As mentioned earlier, these
competing rights might not necessarily constitute a “compelling interest”
(to use the terminology of the U.S. Supreme Court) that would justify statutory restrictions on corporate privacy. Or in terms of the ECHR’s terminology, the restrictive measure might still be proportionate provided that effective remedies would be available to shareholders on a statutory basis or
within the corporate governance structure.340 It is up to the ECHR to examine whether it considers those secondary remedies in the respective member
state sufficient to dismiss a shareholder protection rationale.
As Neuborne has hinted with regard to the American debate, this model also could be extended to account for conflicts with corporate constituencies other than shareholders341 depending on the corporate objective and
governance model prescribed under the respective legal system. While, like
in the United States, the shareholder-centric model is still prevalent in Europe, there are a number of European civil law systems that feature a corporate governance model that is sensitive to stakeholder interests, such as
Germany, France, and most recently the UK.342
However, the ECHR has not only ignored important questions pertaining to the characteristics and underlying relationship of the corporate form,
but it has under-accounted for the question about the nature of the corporation in general.343 Considering that privacy is conceived as a human dignity
right according to European legal culture,344 it seems surprising that the
ECHR has not felt the need to discuss the nature of the corporation, particularly in this context. The ECHR in fact passed up the opportunity to comment on the applicants’ contention in Colas that the corporate premises
should derive protection under the Convention from the rights of its employees, since the business documents seized also included private infor-

340

See PAUL CRAIG, EU LAW 168–69 (2011).
Neuborne, supra note 15, at 774 (“[The legal doctrine of] corporate personality should reflect a
proper calibration of those human activities and relationships, both within the corporation and between
participants in the corporate enterprise and the outside world.”) (emphasis added.)).
342
See Kerr et al., supra note 18, at 113. For example, Germany and France provide for a two-tier
board structure representing stakeholder interests in a supervisory function over management. The UK
has amended its Company Code in 2006 to the effect of an extended corporate objective under the law
that requires directors to act so as to “promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members
as a whole,” including “the interests of the company’s employees, the need to foster the company’s
business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, and the impact of the company’s operations
on the community and the environment.”
343
See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 9–11; see also Autronic AG v.
Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990). For a good overview of the different theories of the corporation, see Millon, supra note 53.
344
See Whitman, supra note 191, at 1161.
341
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mation of such staff.345 It appears that the ECHR is avoiding the hard questions regarding the nature of the corporate rights applicants despite the reality that an explicit discussion of the issue would be logical as the ECHR
faces mounting criticism of judicial activism.
2. The Regulatory State within Corporate Personhood
The lack of corporate theory in the ECHR’s jurisprudence also manifests itself in the failure to assess fundamental rights guarantees for corporations as a structural limitation on the government.346 Much of the jurisprudence and language of the Supreme Court has focused on this exact
dimension of corporate guarantees347 under the Constitution since it gives
important guidance on the regulatory implications of corporate rights decisions.
Unlike the ECHR, the Supreme Court has not yet decided about nonelection related political speech of for-profit corporations. The Supreme
Court was confronted with this question in Nike v. Kasky, but the Court
eventually dismissed the previously granted writ of certiorari as improvidently granted without deciding on the merits.348 Some scholars and commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s sudden dismissal of the
case might have been due to concerns that “recognizing a broad right of
corporations to speak about matters of public concern might have [the] unfortunate effect” of undermining federal securities laws especially when the
speech is exercised in the form of communications to prospective investors
and proxy solicitations.349
The ECHR, however, has held in more than one instance that in such
cases the “margin of appreciation” (i.e., discretion) of national authorities350
was reduced regardless of the potential implications on unfair competition
laws in cases of commercial speech that include a non-commercial element
in terms of contributing to a public debate.351 Thus, the ECHR expands fun345

See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 ¶ 38.
See Millon, supra note 53, at 201.
347
See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 74–76 (1906).
348
Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
349
Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 863, 871 (2007); see also SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION, ch. 5 (2004) (commenting on the apprehension of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to
mixed commercial speech entailing elements of political content).
350
When assessing the necessity of government interference, the state enjoys a certain ‘margin of
appreciation,’ which is usually greater with regard to commercial matters. Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v.
Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 33 (1989).
351
See Hertel v. Switzerland 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 47 (1998) (holding that”[t]he Swiss authorities . . . had some margin of appreciation to decide whether there was a . . . need to impose the injunction in question . . . [;] [s]uch a margin of appreciation is particularly essential in commercial mat346
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damental rights protections of corporations in a way that is less sensitive to
the existing regulatory regimes than seems to be the case in the United
States. An informed discussion about the nature of the corporation, as a fictional person, and its relationship to the state would shed light on important
implications of the line of jurisprudence of the ECHR with regard to corporate fundamental guarantees.
B. Institutional Payout
Aside from this normative payout in the form of doctrinal shifts, putting corporate theory back into the corporate personhood analysis has important institutional payouts for Europe that would help resolve the emerging divergence between the ECJ and ECHR on the issue. While pre-Lisbon
case law of the ECJ signals a strong deference to regulatory authority of EU
institutions over corporations (thus diminishing the rights of corporations
within the EU legal regime),352 the ECHR has granted broad protections to
corporations.353
There is clearly a demand in Europe for resolving this issue in the two
European courts, demand coming from national legal systems themselves.
A transatlantic answer to this dilemma can be found in U.S. jurisprudence.
This approach would bring the ECHR in line with the national legal systems of the member states that have urged the ECHR on several occasions
to deal with the corporate nature of applicants and not simply equate corporations with persons under the Convention without any further analysis.354
A corporate theory-informed methodology would significantly improve the
interaction of the European courts with national legal systems and further
advance the Convention law as an approximation of national laws of member states.355
The discussion in Part 1 below briefly touches on European collectivism and the protection of group rights in national law as well as the contrasting American tradition of individualism. Part 2 examines the evolving
ters, especially in an area as complex and fluctuating as that of unfair competition . . . It is however necessary to reduce the extent of the margin of appreciation when what is at stake is not a given individual’s
purely ‘commercial’ statements, but his participation in a debate affecting the general interest, for example, over public health.”); see also VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H R. 4 ¶
69–71 (2001) (“[I]n the present case the extent of the margin of appreciation is reduced, since what is at
stake is not a given individual’s purely ‘commercial’ interests, but his participation in a debate affecting
the general interest.”).
352
See Case 136/79, Nat’l Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1990 E.C.R. 2033; see also Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 2859.
353
See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 234–35 (elaborating on the “pioneering role” of the ECHR
with regard to corporate rights under the Convention).
354
See Germany, France, Switzerland.
355
See generally Jaanika Erne, Discourse upon the Constituent Human Rights Development in the
European Union, 12 JURIDICA 80 (2007).
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convergence of the European Union’s regulatory system and the ECHR’s
human rights regime and how their differing methodologies can lead to serious incoherencies in the European legal system. A coherent understanding
of corporate personhood would help overcome those contradictions.
1. Reconciling the ECHR and Member State Courts Regarding
Group Rights
While this article does not attempt to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the plausible reasons for the lack of corporate theory in European jurisprudence dealing with corporate personhood, the following section introduces one consideration—European collectivism—that seems to
shed some light on the current legal reality in Europe.
European culture has been influenced significantly by collectivism,
what has translated into a strong protection of group rights. Germany’s
Basic Law [i.e., the German Constitution] provides for an explicit protection of group rights in Article 19 III.356 It might therefore be surprising why
European member states, which were respondents in corporate rights cases
before the ECHR, were resistant to include corporations as legal persons
under the ambit of the Convention.357 Looking at the comments of the respondent governments in the Markt Intern, the Colas, Niemietz, and Autronic cases, it becomes apparent that the issue is not the nature of the corporation as an association or group, but rather the commercial nature of the
activity and the purely economic interests that would bar an application of
Convention rights.358 It might be exactly this legal culture in the member
states and the experienced resistance by respondent states so far that has
motivated the ECHR to avoid an explicit discussion of the corporate identity of the rights applicant and related issues pertaining to corporate theory.
Yet, it does not resolve the issue and further puts in jeopardy the collaboration between the ECHR and member state courts.
American ideology, on the other hand, is deeply grounded in individualism,359 of which corporate activity can be considered a function. The alleged pro-business jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court appears like a
product of the tenets underlying American society. While certainly not
claiming to provide a comprehensive reasoning, this difference in ideology
in the United States and Europe can provide some insights into the possible
356

Note that the U.S. Constitution lacks a similar provision.
See, e.g., Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 ¶ 30; Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44(2) (1990); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 25(1) (1989).
358
See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 30; Niemetz v. Germany, 16 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 97 ¶ 30(2) (1993); Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44
(1990); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 161 ¶ 25(1) (1989).
359
SEYMOUR LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 33 (1996).
357
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reasons for the discrepancy between the corporate personhood jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the ECHR.
2. Mitigating Post-Lisbon Tensions in Overlapping Jurisdiction
between the ECHR and ECJ
The regulatory perspective on corporate personhood is particularly important post-Lisbon due to the convergence between the EU’s regulatory
system and the European human rights regime. The Lisbon Treaty requires
the EU to accede to the Convention, which will have the consequence that
EU institutions are also (directly) bound by the human rights protections
under the Convention.360
The Council of Europe has stated the reasons for the changes in the
EU legal structure as follows:
The EU has developed a separate legal order, with the Court of Justice
of the European Union in Luxembourg as its highest court. Whereas all EU
member states are also parties to the ECHR, the EU itself is currently not.
Even though the EU is founded on the respect for fundamental rights, the
observance of which is ensured by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the ECHR and its judicial mechanism do not formally apply to EU acts.
On the other hand, all member states of the EU, as parties to the Convention, have an obligation to respect the ECHR even when they are applying
or implementing EU law. This divergence may be rectified by the EU, as
such, becoming a party to the Convention.361
The EU’s antitrust proceedings have long been criticized by commentators as lacking the necessary procedural safeguards that would be indicated in light of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. Under the existing Commission rules, for example, “dawn raids” on corporate offices are
often conducted by the EU Commission.362 This practice by the EU Commission has been upheld by the ECJ as being in conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECJ held that the surprise raids as
part of EU competition law enforcement do not violate the ‘home’ protection under Article 8 of the Convention.363 This holding flies in the face of
the ECHR’s long jurisprudence broadly construing the “home” protection
360

See PAUL CRAIG, EU LAW 362–63 (2011).
European Convention on Human Rights: Accession of the EU, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention (last visited March 15,
2014).
362
See Anne MacGregor & Bogdan Gecic, Due Process in EU Competition Cases Following the
Introduction of the New Best Practices Guidelines on Antitrust Proceedings, 3 J. EUR. COMPETITION L.
& PRAC. 425, 425 (2012); see also Alan Riley, Do Companies Have Human Rights: EU antitrust law
may violate due process rules, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970203609204574314333538014034.
363
See Case 136/79, Nat’l Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1990 E.C.R. 2033.
361
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under Article 8 of the Convention to include unwarranted searches and seizures on corporate premises.364
The ECJ also has confirmed other practices that are part of the Commission’s broad investigatory powers as constitutional. Thus, it held that the
EU could request documents without specifically identifying them and impose penalties on a company for refusing to submit to the investigation.365 It
remains to be seen how these broad investigatory powers of the Commission will be judged by the ECHR, which has concurrent jurisdiction on the
matter post-Lisbon.
However, in an attempt to counter-balance the extensive investigatory
powers of the Commission, the ECJ granted corporations some other rights
that go beyond the scope of protections awarded under the European Convention on Human Rights. While the ECJ was not able to find a right
against self-incrimination in the law of the Member States or under the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court still held that it “[i]t is necessary, however, to consider whether certain limitations on the Commission’s powers of investigation are implied by the need to safeguard the
rights of the defence which the Court has held to be a fundamental principle
of the Community legal order.”366 What these limitations entail, and what
body of law they are grounded in, remains to be clarified by the ECJ.
The methodology that the ECJ applies to questions pertaining to corporate fundamental rights protections is primarily guided by the regulatory
state of the EU bureaucracy. In contrast, the approach by the ECHR regarding corporate rights extensions under the Convention is informed by pragmatic teleology of the underlying Convention values. This difference in
methodology has the potential to create serious incoherencies in the European legal system, especially since the ECJ and ECHR will have overlapping jurisdiction on the matter. A systemic and coherent approach to the
questions pertaining to corporate personhood is required that cannot be
conducted in the abstract, but rather needs to be informed by corporate theory for the reasons laid out in this article. In practice, this clash between investigatory discretion of the EU Commission, as confirmed by the ECJ, and
corporate “human” rights protection as promoted by the ECHR will likely
become more pronounced and might create legal insecurity with regard to
corporate rights guarantees in Europe. Finally, it remains to be seen if the
“freedom to conduct business,”367 which is codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (that is binding primary EU law since Lisbon),
364

See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131; Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 97 (1993).
365
Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 2859.
366
Case 74/87, Orkem SA v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 3283 ¶ 32.
367
European Union (EU): Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, December 7,
2000, 40 I.L.M. 266, 268 (2001) (“Freedom to conduct a business: The freedom to conduct a business in
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices is recognised.”).
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might further exacerbate the divergence between the highest EU Court in
Strasbourg and Europe’s human rights court in Luxembourg.
CONCLUSION
The changes in Europe’s fundamental and human rights system in tandem with the alleged overreach of EU institutions, most prominently in an
antitrust context, have put the doctrine of corporate personhood at the forefront of the legal debate. Making corporate theory an important factor in the
analysis ensures that the diversity of shareholder interests is acknowledged
and effectively protected. After all, investor protection has become a key
objective of European governments and the European Union alike.368 Drawing upon corporate theory to address open questions of corporate personhood and related issues of corporate fundamental and human rights will further promote this objective. Aside from such a normative payout in the form
of corporate legal doctrine, this approach also would bring the ECHR in
line with the national legal systems of the member states that have urged the
ECHR on several occasions to deal with the corporate nature of applicants
and not simply equate corporations with persons under the Convention. A
corporate theory-informed methodology would significantly improve the
interaction of the European Courts with national legal systems and further
advance the Convention law as an approximation of national laws of member states.369
While the American approach to corporate personhood has proven to
be much more nuanced with regard to accounting for the corporate nature of
the rights claimant, a more robust analysis of questions pertaining to shareholder protection in large business corporations by the courts’ majority (not
merely in dissent or dicta) is required to mitigate intra-corporate conflicts
effectively. After all, as Justice Stevens has put it, “[c]orporations help
structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their
‘personhood’ often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”370 But their shareholders and stakeholders are the
“People,” as the Supreme Court has reinforced in Hobby Lobby where the
majority emphasized that “it is important to keep in mind that the purpose
of th[e] [corporate] fiction is to provide protection . . . for the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with the
corporation.”371 The premise that shareholders have common interests,
368

See Financial Services: Commission Acts to Improve Investor Protection and Efficiency in the
EU Investment Fund Market, EUR. COMM’N, IP/10/869 (July 1, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-10-869_en.htm).
369
See Sweet & Keller, supra note 87.
370
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
371
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
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might well hold in the realm of business activity of the firm, but one is hard
pressed to find the same alignment in interest with regard to noncommercial activity, such as political speech or corporate secrecy. In fact,
the interests of shareholders are highly diversified and divergent in the
modern corporation.372
It is time to account for this reality in the corporate personhood debate
rather than conducting the debate in a fictional vacuum. We need to put the
“corporate” back into corporate personhood by addressing the possible intra-corporate tensions as a function of modern corporate governance structures. Recourse to corporate theory can help untangle the oxymoron that has
emerged from much of the existing debate on corporate personhood, namely the fiction that corporations are people and thus bearers of the same
rights as individuals. If the European Courts endorse the concept of corporate human rights, this discussion needs to be tied more closely to the interests of a corporation’s human constituents, namely, its shareholders and—
depending on the prevailing corporate theory in a national context—its other stakeholders.

372

See Anabtawi, supra note 154, at 577–93 (showing the divergent interests of shareholders in
terms of long-term versus short-term holdings, diversified versus undiversified portfolios, insider versus
outsider equity ownership, and hedged versus unhedged holders).
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